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 WHY INCENTIVES FOR “PATENT HOLDOUT” 
THREATEN TO DISMANTLE FRAND, AND WHY IT 
MATTERS 
Richard A. Epstein† & Kayvan B. Noroozi†† 
ABSTRACT 
An increasing number of judges, legislators, and scholars, particularly in the United 
States, have wrongly come to believe that the commitment that standard-essential patents 
be licensed on “fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms” (“FRAND”) was principally 
created to advance the interests of technology implementers, and have too often given a 
preference toward implementers’ interests in interpreting FRAND agreements. That 
premise has led American courts to take a categorically hostile view toward awarding 
injunctions against implementers who infringe valid standard-essential patents, fearing that 
the injunctive remedy would give innovators undue leverage. Indeed, American courts 
have been so unilaterally concerned with innovators’ conduct that some have even allowed 
implementers to sue innovators simply for making an opening licensing offer that is later 
deemed “too high,” even if the implementer refused to make any counteroffer at all. An 
implementer–centric view of FRAND has also caused several courts to conclude that 
innovators are not entitled to any share of the commercial benefits arising from the 
standardization of their technologies, and that all such benefits must go to implementers 
alone.  
This Article argues that an implementer–centric view of FRAND’s origins and 
purposes is false. FRAND is a contractual agreement that reflects a voluntary reciprocal 
exchange of benefits and obligations driven by the need to solve significant coordination 
problems in the face of otherwise prohibitive transaction costs. As part of that bargain, 
innovators agree to disclose their latest, confidential discoveries to standard–development 
organizations and to waive their injunction rights as to eventual patents on those 
discoveries, in exchange for contractual protection against “patent holdout” by 
implementers. Those implementers are then permitted to use standard–essential patents on 
the condition that they agree to pay fair and adequate royalties for that use, with the royalty 
amount to be set through mutual good–faith negotiations.  
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Accordingly, this Article stresses that FRAND is not intended to be, and should not be 
interpreted as, a one-sided transfer from innovators to implementers. Rather, implementers 
too owe a significant duty to negotiate FRAND licenses in good faith—a duty that many 
courts have overlooked and underenforced. This Article demonstrates that implementers’ 
good faith obligations are a critical component of the basic FRAND architecture and that 
enforcement of those obligations is strictly necessary to the continued development of 
innovation–driven standards.  
This Article further observes that the FRAND bargain is not simply meant to give 
innovators a way to monetize their intellectual property. Rather, and perhaps more 
significantly, FRAND creates an agreed bargaining framework that allows implementers 
to access innovators’ otherwise–confidential discoveries—inventions so recent that they 
are not otherwise disclosed in patents or published applications. In this way, FRAND 
supplies a solution to an iteration of Kenneth Arrow’s paradox of information, enabling the 
standards development effort to yield commercial benefits that would not exist absent 
innovators’ voluntary participation. Stated otherwise, innovators agree to give 
implementers access—and a fair license—to their most groundbreaking technologies 
because innovators believe that implementers will reciprocally later agree to take a license 
in good faith for using those highly–valuable innovations. This Article shows both 
theoretically and empirically that courts’ failure to appreciate these aspects of the FRAND 
bargain, combined with their overreliance on liability rules (i.e., damages over injunctions) 
incentivizes the very patent holdout problem FRAND was intended to avoid. That 
“efficient infringement” outcome, in turn, has motivated innovators to reduce their 
participation in FRAND bargains, threatening to unravel a massive innovation–
commercialization marketplace and its innumerable positive externalities for all parties. 
To reverse these harms, this Article recommends that courts automatically issue an 
injunction where an implementer is found to infringe valid FRAND–committed patents 
that it did not attempt to license in good faith. This Article also recommends that a proper 
FRAND licensing rate should include some portion of the benefits achieved through 
standardization of the innovations in question. 
More broadly, this Article suggests that courts, policymakers, and academic 
commentators have wrongly favored implementation over innovation—“things” over 
ideas—unwisely frustrating the emergence of an “ideas economy” that should rightly 
assign significant profits to upstream innovators and not to the low–margin manufacturing 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In this Article, we wade into an intellectual thicket that ultimately 
reduces to one question: How should courts and policymakers interpret and 
allocate the corresponding rights and obligations on both sides of the 
FRAND bargain—that is, the contractual agreement between technology 
innovators1 and implementers2 to license standard–essential patents on fair, 
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms? And more specifically, to what 
degree should courts and policymakers continue to fear the possibility of 
“patent holdup”—a chief concern underlying a number of regulatory and 
judicial interventions in the space for more than a decade—as opposed to 
the countervailing risk of “patent holdout” or “efficient infringement”? 
This issue has made it right to the top of the political agenda. As this 
Article was being prepared for publication, its topic became the subject of 
an address on March 16, 2018 by Makan Delrahim, the Assistant Attorney 
General for Antitrust. In a speech titled, The “New Madison” Approach to 
Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law, Mr. Delrahim relied on an earlier 
draft of this Article to support, among other points, the observation that 
 
 1. An “innovator” company may also be an “implementer,” or may focus purely on 
developing innovations. As used herein, the relevant characteristic of an “innovator” is its 
ability, on net, to export innovation to others in the industry.  
 2. As used herein, the term “implementer” refers to a company that is responsible 
for manufacturing and/or commercializing products for sale to end users. The term does 
not exclude the possibility that an “implementer” company may also be an “innovator,” 
either in the same market or in some downstream market. 
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“proponents of using antitrust law to police FRAND commitments 
principally rely on models devoid of economic or empirical evidence that 
hold-up is a real phenomenon, much less one that harms competition.”3  The 
chief function of this Article is to make good on that proposition by offering 
a comprehensive discussion of the considerations that have led both Mr. 
Delrahim, and us, to reach that conclusion. In particular, we demonstrate 
and conclude that courts and policymakers in the United States should be 
far more concerned with the risk of “patent holdout”—a problem they have 
not only largely overlooked, but have actually exacerbated through a series 
of missteps in recent years.  
We use the terms “patent holdup” and “patent holdout” as they have 
been used in the extensive patent literature, and in the general economics 
literature on holdup and holdout problems. In general, by “patent holdup” 
we mean the theoretical claim that innovators of standard–essential patents 
attempt to extract excessively large royalties from implementers after those 
implementers have committed to a particular technological standard that 
requires the use of the patent(s) in question—that is, a standard that renders 
the patent(s) “essential.” Under the “patent holdup” theory, the royalties in 
question are excessively large because they exceed the “true” value of the 
invention(s) in question, and are derived (so the theory goes) because the 
innovator can leverage the implementer’s sunk cost in committing to the 
standard to extract more than a fair royalty.4 By “patent holdout” we mean 
the converse problem—that an implementer refuses to negotiate in good 
faith with an innovator for a license to valid patent(s) that the implementer 
infringes, and instead forces the innovator to either undertake significant 
litigation costs and time delays to extract a licensing payment through a 
court order, or else to simply drop the matter because the licensing game is 
no longer worth the candle. We also use the term “efficient infringement” 
synonymously with “patent holdout” here. 
The “holdout” or “efficient infringement” problem is, of course, not 
limited to the standard-essential patent context or even to patent cases as a 
 
 3. Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The “New 
Madison” Approach to Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law 9 & n.30 (Mar. 16, 2018), 
www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1044316/download. Our Article was communicated to 
Delrahim in a letter of February 13, 2018, which was signed by several academics, 
including Epstein. Letter from Jonathan Barnett et al., Professor, USC Gould Sch. of Law, 
to Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Feb. 13, 2018), 
https://cpip.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/31/2018/02/Letter-to-DOJ-Supporting-
Evidence-Based-Approach-to-Antitrust-Enforcement-of-IP.pdf.  
4. See generally, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty 
Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991 (2007). 
2017] INCENTIVES FOR “PATENT HOLDOUT”  1385 
whole. The ongoing saga between Oracle and Google regarding Google’s 
copying of 11,500 lines of Java code indicates that “efficient infringement” 
is an (unfortunately) attractive business strategy in the copyright context as 
well, where the ability to take another’s computer code while refusing to 
pay for a license can result in wealth transfers in the billions of dollars.5 By 
way of background, Google failed in 2005 to obtain a license from Sun (now 
Oracle) for implementing Java in Android mobile devices.6 When Google 
failed in its own efforts to develop critical components on its own, it decided 
to lift them from Oracle—copying 11,500 lines of Oracle’s code verbatim 
into Android.7 Google then undercut the market for products that 
incorporated (or could have incorporated) Oracle’s technology for a fee, 
refused to pay Oracle, and chose instead to litigate.8 Thirteen years later, the 
dispute continues to work through the courts, despite two trials and two 
decisions on appeal. Most recently, the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit rejected Google’s fair use defense and remanded the case for a trial 
to determine the extent of Google’s liability for damages.9 Here is a case 
where injunctive relief is called for to stop the theft–Google made all of its 
liability arguments and lost. It should have to settle, redesign its products to 
eliminate infringement, or be enjoined. Otherwise thirteen years of 
litigation can quickly become eighteen, with no end in sight—a modern 
version of Dickens’s Bleak House.10 Yet the presiding district court judge—
having twice ruled for Google and been twice reversed—appears to show 
little concern for Oracle’s predicament, and is unlikely to exercise his 
discretion to award an injunction. 
While many of our observations here apply outside the context of 
standard-essential patents and FRAND, we nonetheless focus on that 
microcosm precisely because the question of FRAND’s proper 
interpretation is at the forefront of a number of broader issues that will 
ultimately shape this century’s “ideas economy.” 
To address that question, Part II begins with an explanation of how 
FRAND bargaining was developed and how it functions in the context of 
 
 5. See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google LLC, Nos. 2017-1118, 2017-1202, 2018 WL 
1473875, at *19 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 27, 2018) (“It is undisputed, however, that Google copied 
11,500 lines of code—11,330 more lines than necessary to write in Java.”). 
 6. See Peter S. Menell, API Copyrightability Bleak House: Unraveling and 
Repairing the Oracle v. Google Jurisdictional Mess, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1515, 1542 
(2016) (describing how license “negotiations unraveled” because of “Google’s 
unwillingness to agree to make Android fully compatible with the Java platform”). 
 7. Oracle Am., 2018 WL 1473875, at *19. 
 8. Id. at *22. 
 9. Id. at *23–24. 
 10. In fact, Professor Peter Menell has made this exact comparison in describing the 
protracted litigation. See Menell, supra note 6, at 1517–18. 
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Standards Developing Organizations (“SDOs”), which establishes the 
institutional framework for these negotiations. Part II approaches that 
question from its intellectual and factual foundations by first considering 
the market forces that engendered the FRAND framework, the nature of the 
FRAND agreement, and the purposes it is intended to serve. Part II then 
considers how FRAND obligations relate to traditional rate–making 
operations of common carriers and public utilities, and the lessons to be 
learned from the good–faith bargaining obligations in labor–management 
relationships, which are shaped by very different political forces. This 
discussion highlights the innumerable benefits that a properly functioning 
FRAND regime permits, as well as the mutuality of consideration that is 
necessary, both ex ante and ex post, to hold that voluntary regime together.  
In particular, at their inception, FRAND obligations arose as contractual 
commitments intended to serve the interests of both innovators and 
implementers by making both sides to the exchange better off than before. 
To be sure, that contractual point has been recognized in the abstract in 
many cases,11 but nonetheless it has been insufficiently appreciated in 
application. A proper understanding of FRAND principles thus begins not 
with a view toward patent law, antitrust law, or regulatory policy, but with 
reference to the underlying contractual architecture and quid pro quo of the 
FRAND bargain. Since FRAND contracts are willing agreements between 
highly competent parties, it logically follows that such agreements, 
correctly interpreted, must generate valuable benefits to innovators and 
implementers alike.  
No one should underestimate the difficulty of realizing these benefits. 
In most situations it is easier to reach an agreement, or to develop a series 
of customary practices, when the two parties stand in a symmetrical 
relationship with each other as opposed to when they occupy distinct roles. 
Thus, the customary obligations of partners to each other are easier to 
determine than those of a buyer and seller, or a landlord and tenant, or a 
licensor and licensee. In these last three cases, the gains from trade may be 
enormous, but it is no longer possible to adopt parallel obligations on both 
parties. Therefore, it is necessary to determine how the differences in role 
 
 11. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 2d 993, 999 (W.D. 
Wash. 2012) (recognizing that FRAND commitments made through standards 
development organizations are contractual); Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 886 F. 
Supp. 2d 1061, 1083 (W.D. Wis. 2012) (same); In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent 
Litig., No. 11 C 9308, 2013 WL 5593609, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013) (same). 
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determine obligations, a more complex problem for which the dominant 
solution is less clear and harder to ascertain.12 
Part III applies these observations to a discussion of the prior academic 
contributions and concludes that, in view of the particularly high transaction 
costs at play and the significant informational advantage the parties hold 
over the courts, a correct and socially efficient treatment of FRAND 
disputes should shift the parties’ incentives toward negotiated solutions 
through a recognition of strong property rights. To achieve that aim, 
injunctions should be the presumptive remedy in infringement actions 
involving declared standard–essential patents. The defendant, in turn, can 
rebut that presumption (or obviate the question of remedies altogether) upon 
a showing that its own pre–suit negotiation conduct was in good faith—that 
is, that the defendant either made a good faith licensing offer in view of 
FRAND or else was justified in making no offer at all because it has proven 
noninfringement or invalidity of the patent(s) in suit. The damages remedy 
would occupy a subordinate, yet important position—growing in 
significance where mutual good faith discussions have reached a genuine 
impasse or when it is necessary to determine compensation for attorneys’ 
fees that are incurred due to a breach of the patent holder’s good faith 
covenant.  
By contrast, any principal reliance on liability rules comes out second 
best because it is likely to miss the reciprocal benefits underlying the 
voluntary FRAND agreement and encourages implementers to engage in 
inefficient and opportunistic “holdout” from good faith discussions. With 
this in mind, Part III proposes a mixed system that is subtler and more 
flexible than an all–or–nothing choice between “property rules” and 
“liability rules,” as those terms were used by Guido Calabresi and A. 
Douglas Melamed in their path–breaking article on the subject.13 That 
article, in an unspoken artificial limitation, only considered legal remedies 
that embodied the pure form of one or the other type of remedy, without 
asking what mix of the two forms of relief could outperform the exclusive 
reliance on one remedy or the other.14 This approach also diverges from the 
writings of commentators like Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro—who have 
 
 12. For a discussion in connection with the emergence of custom, see Richard A. 
Epstein, The Path to the T.J. Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom in the Law of 
Tort, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1992), dealing with both customary practices and specific 
contractual arrangements. 
 13. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability 
Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
 14. See id. at 1109–11.       
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expressed a near–categorical aversion to the injunctive remedy for fear of 
the risks of “patent holdup” and “royalty stacking.”15 Instead, it incorporates 
the insights of others, like Robert Merges, who have recognized the 
superiority of strong property rights as a starting point for resolving the high 
transaction costs that are inherent to intellectual property exchanges in 
general and patents in particular.16 The FRAND agreement is itself an 
example of the positive effect of a presumptive injunctive remedy, for 
FRAND obligations owe their existence to the presumption of injunctive 
relief. Part III also discusses the example of patent pools, which present 
another (and complementary) market solution to the problem of patent 
transaction costs, and further counsel against hasty judicial interventions 
into the complex machinations of the innovation marketplace.  
Finally, Part III describes the detailed empirical studies that have all 
come to the same conclusion: theoretical concerns regarding patent holdup 
and royalty stacking have not borne out in industries subject to innovation–
driven standardization, such as mobile handsets. Instead, the evidence 
points to the sharp lowering of prices, continuous innovation, low aggregate 
patent royalty payments, and increasing market penetration.17  
Part IV then tests the framework described in Part III against recent 
court decisions and an intellectual property rights (“IPR”) policy revision 
by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (“IEEE”).18 In so 
doing, it identifies the significant distortions and social inefficiencies that 
arise from ex post, one–sided revisionism of the FRAND contract, which 
evidences the unjustified preference for liability rules over property rights. 
Part IV proposes, in particular, an alternative approach to the IEEE’s policy 
revision and to decisions such as Apple v. Motorola19 and Microsoft v. 
Motorola20—all of which have failed to take a balanced view of the duty of 
good faith and fair dealing underlying the FRAND agreement. In particular, 
 
 15. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 4. 
 16. See generally Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual 
Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655 (1994). 
 17. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Barnett, Has the Academy Led Patent Law Astray?, 32 
BERKELEY TECH. L. J.  1313 (2017); Alexander Galetovic et al., Is There Evidence of an 
Anticommons Tragedy in the Smartphone Industry?, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1527(2017) 
(noting that the “average cumulative royalty yield from . . . 21 identified patent licensors. 
. . . is 3.4 percent”); see also J. Gregory Sidak, Testing for Bias to Suppress Royalties for 
Standard-Essential Patents, 1 CRITERION J. ON INNOVATION 301, 301–02 (2016) 
(describing royalty–limiting steps taking by SSOs like the IEEE).  
 18. IEEE, IEEE-SA STANDARDS BOARD BYLAWS § 6.1 at 16 (2017), 
http://standards.ieee.org/develop/policies/bylaws/sb_bylaws.pdf. 
 19. 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 20. 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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implementers should be held to a reciprocal duty to negotiate a FRAND 
license in good faith, the breach of which should automatically trigger an 
injunction upon a finding that the patents at issue are valid and infringed, 
unless the innovator’s pre–suit offer is itself found not to have been in good 
faith. In this context, we discuss the European Union Court of Justice’s 
decision in Huawei v. ZTE,21 as well as the United Kingdom High Court’s 
more recent decision in Unwired Planet v. Huawei,22 both of which have 
advanced rules similar to those proposed here. Part IV then turns to a 
discussion of another aspect of the IEEE’s policy revision, as well as two 
Federal Circuit decisions, which have incorrectly deprived innovators of 
any share of the benefits from the standardization of their technological 
contributions, creating further distortions in the FRAND framework with 
significant negative follow–on effects in the innovation marketplace.  
Part V concludes with a broader discussion of the significance of these 
issues to the emergence of the “ideas economy,” in which it has become 
more critical than ever both to reduce transaction costs around the patent 
right and to protect and reward innovation. Part V observes the sharp 
disconnect between the philosophical underpinnings of redefining the 
FRAND contract in favor of implementers—a primacy of implementation 
over innovation—and the much larger forces shaping the future of the 
American and global economies. The current preference for, as it were, 
“things over ideas” is rooted in an implicit premise captured by the maxim, 
“easier said than done.” In other words, because our historical economic 
experience has taught that ideas are “easy,” but their execution is difficult, 
modern courts and commentators have exhibited a specious attraction to the 
notion that “building” tangible objects—even if through means like 
programming software—should capture more value than the simple 
contribution of “ideas” to that endeavor. Yet this conventional view is 
dangerously outdated.  
Today, the United States is at the forefront of an ideas economy in which 
new forces such as globalization, 3D printing, and robotics (to name a few) 
are rapidly rendering it much easier to build an embodiment of a great 
innovation than to develop the innovation itself. Thus, for instance, two of 
the five top–selling smartphone manufacturers in the world are now Oppo 
 
 21. See generally Case C-170/13, Huawei Tech. Co. v. ZTE Corp., 2015 E.C.R. 477.  
 22. See generally Jorge L. Contreras, Unwired Planet v. Huawei: An English 
Perspective on FRAND Royalties, PATENTLY-O (Apr. 10, 2017), https://patentlyo.com/
patent/2017/04/unwired-perspective-royalties.html. 
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and Vivo23—relatively new entrants with no history of developing 
significant smartphone innovations either as part of SDOs24 or 
independently at a device–specific level. As another example, Tesla has 
vowed to build fully automated factories in which robots alone will build 
its fleet of vehicles without human involvement.25 As yet a third example, 
ARM—the company behind the design of virtually every smartphone 
processor chip—does not make or sell any actual chips.26 Instead, it designs 
groundbreaking and fundamental chip architecture, and licenses its 
architectural designs to nearly every major player in the smartphone 
space.27  
In order for the ideas economy to develop and thrive in its most dynamic 
and accessible form, it is imperative that ideas be valued, protected, and 
rewarded in accordance with their contributions, without relying on 
outdated presuppositions favoring incumbents who own the means of 
production.  
Thus, as this Article demonstrates, the prevailing mishandling of 
FRAND is a trend in precisely the wrong direction. As such, these recent 
developments are part of an important and broader misstep away from 
protecting and valuing intellectual property at precisely the wrong time. 
II. UNDERSTANDING FRAND: THE MANY GAINS FROM 
COOPERATION 
The simple fact of standardization, independent of the specifics of any 
particular standard and absent any innovation, accrues important benefits to 
 
 23. See Worldwide Smartphone Shipments Up 1.0% Year over Year in Third Quarter 
Despite Samsung Galaxy Note 7 Recall, According to IDC, INT’L DATA CORP. (Oct. 26, 
2016), https://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerId=prUS41882816 (gathering data from 
the third quarter of 2016).  
 24. The ETSI IPR Online Database does not list either Oppo or Vivo among the 239 
companies that have declared nearly 200,000 patents related to ETSI’s more than 8,500 
cellular telecommunications standards. ETSI IPR Online Database, EUROPEAN 
TELECOMMS. STANDARDS INST., https://ipr.etsi.org/SearchIPRD.aspx (last visited 
February 13, 2018) (listing companies inside the “Declaring companies” box on the search 
page, which is visible after clicking “confirm to continue” on the disclaimer). 
 25. See Greg Kumparak, A Glimpse Inside Tesla’s Super Secretive Gigafactory, 
TECHCRUNCH (July 29, 2016), http://techcrunch.com/2016/07/29/a-glimpse-inside-teslas-
super-secretive-gigafactory/ (quoting Elon Musk’s description of one such factory as “a 
machine to build the machines”). 
 26. See Architectures, Processors, and Devices, ARM at 1-1 to 1-2 (May 19, 2009), 
http://infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.dht0001a/DHT0001A_architecture_pr
ocessors_and_devices.pdf. 
 27. See id.; see also Bowman Heiden & Jens Andreasson, Reevaluating Patent 
Damages in the Knowledge Economy: The Intellectual Value Chain and the Royalty Base 
for Standard-Essential Patents, 1 CRITERION J. ON INNOVATION 229, 266–69 (2016). 
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implementers. The cellular telecommunications market, for instance, is 
composed of two critical categories of participants—handset makers and 
cellular carriers—who must coordinate around innumerable 
implementation details to make the market function. Standardization, in 
such cases, solves coordination problems more efficiently than a series of 
bilateral negotiations. It also enlarges the market on both sides by growing 
the addressable consumer base through interoperability and network effects. 
In addition, it reduces marginal costs by reducing the number of options that 
each company must support and decreasing the contracting and 
coordination costs that would accrue absent standardization. Thus, 
implementers’ attraction to setting standards is easy to understand. 
But standardization alone captures only a sliver of the coordination 
gains that are achievable in technology–driven markets. Once the 
standardization game is under way, it is not enough to merely set default 
rules (like picking a side of the road to drive on). In context, the key choices 
are not between two inconsequential alternatives but rather among rival 
technologies, some of which are necessarily better and some of which are 
necessarily worse. Certain superior technologies only work as alternatives, 
not complements, to certain inferior technologies. It is therefore not enough 
to simply pick a baseline and let individual firms find their way to better 
implementations. Rather, the choice of technologies becomes a focal 
endeavor, for there is no inherent reason for implementers to lock 
themselves into offering consumers a less compelling product than what the 
forefront of technology would otherwise allow. Innovation–driven 
standardization also provides a form of competitive insurance by reducing 
each implementer’s risk in a winner–take–all environment in which only a 
few companies offer critical innovations that leave others fully in the dust, 
e.g., by offering 4G LTE while other companies are only capable of offering 
3G products. Behind the veil of ignorance with respect to comparative 
innovation, competitors will naturally seek to reduce the catastrophic risk 
of disruption by coordinating around a high baseline of innovation adoption. 
At the same time, incorporating key innovations into technical standards 
generates further marginal cost efficiencies with respect to marketing. As 
the number of companies advertising and explaining a next–generation 
technology increases, the necessary marketing expenditure per company 
decreases. The credibility of the message is enhanced because it is repeated 
consistently by several firms at once. 
The desire to standardize innovations, however, gives rise to a series of 
challenges. Most notable are the questions of how to identify and efficiently 
license the innovations that should form the standard. With respect to 
identifying the set of innovations for consideration, one possible solution is 
1392 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32:1381  
to look only to those innovations that have already resulted in issued patents, 
which are necessarily disclosed in publicly available publications. That 
approach proves suboptimal, however, as the most attractive innovations 
are often the newest ideas, which by their nature have not been disclosed in 
either issued patents or published patent applications. Implementers thus 
cannot learn about such discoveries by searching for them among public 
records; the information must come to them. At this point, the transaction 
challenge becomes particularly acute: if an innovator discloses its as–yet–
unprotected invention, it has nothing left to sell. Alternatively, 
implementers cannot buy what they do not know is for sale—a variation of 
Arrow’s “paradox of information.”28 The complications do not end there. 
Once a technology has been selected for incorporation into the standard, the 
question becomes how rights to the technology should best be acquired. 
Securing licenses to all of the necessary patents or patent applications prior 
to formally promulgating the standard will entail huge transaction costs.29 
The alternative of selecting the standard first and negotiating patent licenses 
second, however, is no less problematic: since each patent holder holds the 
right to exclude, any single patent holder may refuse to grant a license and 
instead seek an injunction in order to capture monopolistic rents through a 
conscious strategy of “patent holdup.” 
From the implementers’ perspective, the solution is to form an 
innovation marketplace—that is, a means for innovative ideas to be 
presented to the implementers—thus reducing search costs, creating 
information aggregation effects regarding “state of the art” technologies, 
and providing access to the latest as–yet–unpatented discoveries. This, in 
turn, allows implementers to specialize more heavily in implementation 
instead of devoting inefficient and duplicative resources toward innovation. 
Critically, these cooperative efforts create an opportunity to contract around 
the risks of injunctions and patent holdup by imposing “terms of entry” 
restrictions on innovators who elect to participate in that marketplace.  
But innovators will have no interest in entering such a marketplace 
unless they first receive assurances that they can expect a reasonable risk–
adjusted profit that exceeds their opportunity cost. Most significantly, 
innovators would need assurances that, if they disclose their latest 
nonpublic discoveries and waive their categorical right to exclude 
unauthorized use of their inventions, they will be compensated through a 
 
 28. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for 
Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
FACTORS 609, 615 (1962).  
 29. See Merges, supra note 8, at 2661 (recognizing the high transactions costs 
inherent to intellectual property). 
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fair share of the ensuing benefits that leaves them better off than they would 
be by self–commercializing their inventions and maintaining exclusionary 
rights to their intellectual property. After all, once they have disclosed their 
inventions to implementers and waived their categorical right to an 
injunction, innovators have little leverage against the risk of widespread 
infringement and the need for costly litigation—that is, “patent holdout” or 
“efficient infringement.” 
Yet these challenges have not proven insurmountable. To cut the 
Gordian knot, innovators and implementers have worked through standards 
developing organizations (“SDOs”) to develop the FRAND framework—a 
contractual solution whereby implementers agree to take a license to any 
standard–essential patent on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms 
(“FRAND”), and to negotiate such terms in good faith. Innovators 
reciprocally agree to bring their latest discoveries to the marketplace, to 
notify the SDO of intellectual property rights (including patent applications) 
that would be infringed by the use of such disclosed technologies, to offer 
FRAND licenses for any eventual standard–essential patents (“SEPs”) in 
good faith, and to forego their categorical right to exclude willing licensees 
from the use of standard–essential innovations.30 Critically, innovators are 
not forced or legally required to make FRAND commitments, but rather do 
so willingly and voluntarily.31  
The FRAND contract is thus meant to solve a host of coordination 
problems between potential bilateral monopolists seeking technology–
driven standardization. Their goal is to create innovation–driven standards 
that reward the efforts of each contributor. The FRAND agreement for 
standards development allows the emergence of an innovation marketplace 
that yields massive positive externalities, including benefits for downstream 
customers.32 This win–win outcome is consistent with Robert Merges’ 
 
 30. See EUROPEAN TELECOMMS. STANDARDS INST., ETSI INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS POLICY (VERSION 37) 35–36, 42–43 (2017), https://portal.etsi.org/directives/37_
directives_apr_2017.pdf (discussing “[d]isclosure of IPRs” and “availability of [l]icenses”) 
[hereinafter ETSI Intellectual Property Rights Policy]. 
 31. Id. at 37–38 (discussing “[n]on-availability of [l]icenses”). 
 32. See the ETSI’s policy objectives, which state:  
It is ETSI’s objective to create STANDARDS and TECHNICAL 
SPECIFICATIONS that are based on solutions which best meet the 
technical objectives of the European telecommunications sector, as 
defined by the General Assembly. In order to further this objective the 
ETSI IPR POLICY seeks to reduce the risk to ETSI, MEMBERS, and 
others applying ETSI STANDARDS and TECHNICAL 
SPECIFICATIONS, that investment in the preparation, adoption and 
application of STANDARDS could be wasted as a result of an 
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observation that “in the presence of high transaction costs, industry 
participants have an incentive to invest in institutions that lower the costs of 
IPR exchange.”33  
Indeed, as demonstrated above, the FRAND agreement owes its 
existence to the immutability of two significant transaction costs: the 
perceived threat of the injunction remedy and the lack of public disclosure 
of the most recent innovations. Because implementers fear that innovation 
standardization may give rise to ex post injunctions and “patent holdup,” 
they are motivated to bargain ex ante with innovators to establish voluntary 
institutions that facilitate contractual solutions.34 And because innovators’ 
latest discoveries are not yet published in patents or patent applications, 
implementers need to offer innovators some substantial consideration to 
motivate them to reveal those discoveries, which can then be incorporated 
into workable standards. In exchange, innovators naturally seek assurances 
against “patent holdout” or “efficient infringement” by way of promises of 
adequate risk–adjusted and opportunity cost–adjusted profits whenever 
their inventions become standard–essential.  
This mutuality of considerations has been at the heart of the voluntary 
FRAND bargain from the outset, given that any risks of holdup or 
misappropriation of information are bilateral—that is, such risks work in 
both directions. Unfortunately, the innovation marketplace it enables 
quickly unravels once the bargain is revised or reinterpreted in ways that 
shortchange innovators. Thus, in 1992, the European Commission observed 
that “the incentive to develop new products and processes on which to base 
 
ESSENTIAL IPR for a STANDARD or TECHNICAL 
SPECIFICATION being unavailable. In achieving this objective, the 
ETSI IPR POLICY seeks a balance between the needs of standardization 
for public use in the field of telecommunications and the rights of the 
owners of IPRs. IPR holders whether members of ETSI and their 
AFFILIATES or third parties, should be adequately and fairly rewarded 
for the use of their IPRs in the implementation of STANDARDS and 
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. 
Id. at 35. 
 33. Merges, supra note 8, at 2655. 
 34. See id. (“[I]n the presence of high transaction costs, industry participants have an 
incentive to invest in institutions that lower the costs of IPR exchange.”); see also Robert 
P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective 
Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293, 1346 (1996) (“Without . . . property 
rights—backed by the threat of production-choking injunctions—the advantages conveyed 
by the [patent] pool would never have been realized.”). 
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future standardization will be lost if the standard-making process is carried 
out without due regard for intellectual property rights.”35  
The European Telecommunications Standard Institute (“ETSI”)—one 
of the most active SDOs, which has been largely responsible for developing 
generations of cellular telecommunications standards—has learned that 
lesson the hard way. As Roger Brooks and Damien Geradin recount, ETSI’s 
initial efforts at crafting an IPR Policy sought to “advance” the prior norms 
by increasing restrictions on innovators through market–limiting measures 
such as maximum royalty rates, “automatic licensing,” total waivers of the 
injunction remedy, and mandatory arbitration.36 These efforts, however, 
were met with fierce opposition and criticism from both members (some of 
whom threatened to withdraw from ETSI) and other, more experienced 
SDOs.37 Ultimately in 1994, ETSI abandoned its innovation–restrictive 
policies and adopted a traditional FRAND policy that largely remains in 
place today.38  
Thus, in its current form, the ETSI IPR Policy provides that its 
“objectives” are to “seek[] a balance between the needs of standardization 
for public use in the field of telecommunications and the rights of the 
owners of IPRs”; ETSI particularly notes that “IPR holders . . . should be 
adequately and fairly rewarded for the use of their IPRs in the 
implementation of STANDARDS and TECHNICAL 
SPECIFICATIONS.”39  
That approach is consistent with other SDOs, like the International 
Telecommunications Union (“ITU”), which has stated that its IPR policy 
seeks “a working balance between the interests of SEP owners and 
implementers . . . by ensuring that owners of intellectual property will be 
motivated to contribute their patented technologies to the standards-
development process and that the standards incorporating these 
technologies will remain widely available to implementers.”40 
 
 35. COMM’N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, COMMUNICATION FROM THE 
COMMISSION: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND STANDARDIZATION 1 (1992), 
http://aei.pitt.edu/1222/1/1222.pdf. 
 36. See Roger G. Brooks & Damien Geradin, Interpreting and Enforcing the 
Voluntary FRAND Commitment, 9 INT’L J. IT STANDARDS & STANDARDIZATION RES. 1, 
17 (2011). 
 37. Id.  
 38. Id. at 21.  
 39. ETSI Intellectual Property Rights Policy, supra note 20, at 37. 
 40. Balancing Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights in a Standards-Setting 
Context, INT’L TELECOMM. UNION (2012), https://itunews.itu.int/en/3049-Balancing-
innovation-and-intellectual-property-rights-in-a-standards-setting-context.note.aspx. 
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Notably, ETSI’s 1994 FRAND framework was deliberately vague, 
leaving flexibility for parties to bilaterally negotiate its meaning in the 
context of their particular circumstances. Since adopting its 1994 IPR 
Policy, ETSI has twice rejected efforts to narrow and more tightly define 
FRAND.41 The incomplete nature of the FRAND contract is therefore 
neither an oversight by SDOs nor an invitation for courts to fill in the gaps 
or clarify the boundaries, but rather an architectural design feature of the 
FRAND framework that has been critical to its success.  
Indeed, that same structural flexibility was significant to the success of 
traditional forms of rate regulation rules that deal with common carriers and 
public utilities, to whom the FRAND rules originally applied and who—by 
virtue of their monopoly position—were long obligated to hold themselves 
out to provide services to all parties on fair, reasonable, and 
nondiscriminatory terms.42 And a comparative analysis of FRAND’s 
workings in that earlier context further informs a proper understanding of 
the FRAND bargain with respect to standard–essential patents. 
To be sure, the complications inherent in the FRAND framework were 
more tractable in the earlier rate regulation context than in the patent space, 
and for three reasons. The first has to do with the nature of the regulated 
businesses. Common carriers and public utilities are all massive, unified 
operations whose value is embodied in a few key facilities of enormous 
value, such as power plants or distribution networks. The standard rate–
making procedure to deal with public utility regulations assumes that there 
is no close substitute to the particular public utility, which is required to 
justify investment of heavy sums in the construction of its plant before it 
obtains any return from its more or less captive customer base. The large 
size of the investment means that the rate calculations are performed on a 
coherent set of assets and not on large, shifting portfolios of smaller assets 
that comprise the whole. Second, the rate of technical change in the public 
 
 41. See Brooks & Geradin, supra note 26, at 18–21 (chronicling ETSI’s decisions in 
1994 and 2006 to reject “restrictions or interpretations identical or analogous to many of 
those advocated today by the proponents of the restrictive FRAND regimes,” including 
automatic licensing, requiring a declaration of maximum royalty rates, and mandatory 
arbitration).  
 42. For a general account of the problem, see Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 
U.S. 299 (1989). The origins of the doctrine were set out by Sir Matthew Hale in his treatise 
De Portis Maribus, which noted that it was proper to impose price limitations on businesses 
“affected with the public interest, or monopolies.” See Richard A. Epstein, The Reflections 
and Responses of a Legal Contrarian, 44 TULSA L. REV. 647, 669 n.61 (2008). That rule 
was incorporated into English law in Allnut v. Inglis in 1810. 104 Eng. Rep. 206 (K.B. 
1810). Finally, in 1876, it worked its way into American law in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 
113 (1876). The term “virtual monopoly,” used in Munn to capture the difficulty of the 
subject, derives from Allnut. See Epstein, supra note 42, at 669 n.61. 
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utility and common carrier space has traditionally been relatively slow, so 
it is possible to make long–term calculations with a fair degree of certainty. 
And third, the rates are generally given to large classes of customers on a 
take–it–or–leave it basis. Traditional rate regulation, therefore, does not 
contemplate the second round of negotiation that is perfectly routine today 
between the holder of a SEP and its infringers, who vary widely in size and 
their individual usages of their product in question. For instance, with 
certain key standards, such as those for Wi-Fi, the stakes are far larger than 
they are for any physical plant, given that these key standards work 
themselves into a staggeringly large set of downstream applications by large 
numbers of unrelated parties. Oftentimes, the value of the SEP can be 
determined only in relationship to the ultimate use that the licensee makes 
of the patent in its own business. 
Nonetheless, there are certain features of standard rate regulation that 
do apply to FRAND negotiations over SEPs. The first of these is that rate 
regulation is intended to make sure that any given monopolist does not 
receive more than a competitive rate of return for the use of its products or 
services. One corollary of this proposition is that the system of rate 
regulation should never introduce into its rate structure cross–subsidies 
among different classes of users.43 Those subsidies are not sustainable in 
competitive markets because those customers who are called upon to supply 
the subsidy will be able to switch easily to another supplier, thus rendering 
the entire cross–subsidization project a failure. But given that there are no 
close substitutes to a common carrier or public utility, the cross–subsidy 
possibility is real, but also destructive. The moment that these cross 
subsidies are allowed, it introduces an element of jockeying whereby 
politically influential groups will seek to exert these disguised wealth 
transfers in their own favor. The new arrangement thus poses the well–
known dangers of rent–seeking behavior that always arise when property 
rights are made indefinite, a result which in this instance is by design.  
The traditional systems of rate regulation took steps to guard against 
transfer payments, such as those that might occur when the passenger 
business of a railroad is taxed to subsidize its freight division,44 when the 
rate of return on a regulated portion of the business is reduced because the 
firm made sufficient profits from its unregulated activities,45 or when a 
 
 43. See generally Richard A. Epstein, The History of Public Utility Regulation in the 
United States Supreme Court: Of Reasonable and Nondiscriminatory Rates, 38 J. SUP. CT. 
HIST. 345 (2013).  
 44. See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Conley, 236 U.S. 605 (1915). 
 45. See, e.g., Brooks–Scanlon Co. v. R.R. Comm’n of La., 251 U.S. 396 (1920). 
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regulated firm is denied a guaranteed rate of return in any given period 
based on the regulator’s promise to make up the shortfall in some future 
period.46 These relatively hard–edged rules do not displace the higher level 
of judicial deference given in ratemaking cases when there is no clear 
method of accounting. For example, in the illustration above, the joint costs 
that are incurred to ship both freight and passenger cars on the same train. 
One danger with the common legal position that damages should be the first 
remedy in patent disputes is that, in the context of multiparty deals, it 
encourages the introduction of cross–subsidies through the back door. 
The success of a rate–making system in dealing with these risks depends 
heavily on the level of scrutiny that is given to the entire operation. The low 
“rational basis” standard of constitutional law invites a level of cross–
subsidization that is not tolerated when either an intermediate–scrutiny or 
strict–scrutiny standard is applied. In both these cases, the central test for 
government coercion is whether it brings the overall system closer to the 
competitive norm that can never be reached. But the opposite approach 
arises when the legal system introduces a set of institutions that seeks to 
create the very holdout problems that sound systems of rate regulation seek 
to eliminate.  
The most instructive example of how these negotiations can backfire 
arises with mandatory collective bargaining under the National Labor 
Relations Act (“NLRA”),47 the permutations of which have governed 
management–labor relations since 1935. Under the basic scheme, 
management is placed under a duty to bargain in good faith with a union 
that has been selected by majority vote within a designated bargaining unit, 
after which the union functions as the exclusive representative of all 
members of the unit, whether they voted for the union or not. Interestingly 
enough, the Taft–Hartley amendments to the statute added a duty on the 
union to negotiate in good faith with management in an effort to reach a 
deal. The turbulent history of labor relations shows that it is difficult to 
make these arrangements work in light of the high emotions that are often 
on both sides of the table. Indeed, the structure condemns these bargaining 
relationships to failure in ways that the FRAND negotiations are 
consciously designed to avoid.  
As with FRAND–-type arrangements, labor negotiations revolve 
around two related axes. The first addresses the internal relations among 
various union members over the division of the potential gains from 
 
 46. See, e.g., Bd. of Pub. Util. Comm’rs v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 271 U.S. 23 (1926). 
However, this principle was disregarded in AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 
(1999). 
 47. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2012). 
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negotiation with management. These issues are acute because unions often 
represent workers that have inherent conflicts with each other. Some 
workers have seniority that others do not. A small fraction of union 
members may have more skilled jobs than the majority of the members. To 
deal with this question, the law imposes a duty of fair representation on the 
union representative. This responsibility, however, has proven 
extraordinarily difficult to enforce judicially, so that in practice these 
conflicts are resolved by protracted and informal negotiations.48  
The second axis concerns the pattern of negotiation between the union 
and management under the good–faith umbrella that applies to both sides. 
The question is what good faith means. In some contexts, it has a clear 
meaning. For example, a purchaser acts in good faith when she buys 
property from a party whom she thinks is the rightful owner, but who in fact 
is not. The good–faith defense often protects that innocent purchaser from 
a suit by the true owner to recover the property in question, leaving the 
owner with only a typically futile action against the thief or converter for 
damages. Closer to home, the duty of good faith in connection with 
partnership arrangements requires each partner in his various business 
dealings to weigh the interest of his partners equally with his own. By taking 
into account all costs and benefits, the duty encourages all parties to 
maximize the good of the whole. When followed uniformly by all such 
partners, it leads to the highest level of output. As an offshoot of that 
definition, it is commonly held that an insurance company that defends a 
claim against an insured party under a policy that offers only limited 
coverage is required to weigh the interest of the insured as equal to its own, 
which is the only way to minimize the expected cost of the suit, taking into 
account both the costs of litigation and settlement.49 In all of these cases, 
the use of a good–faith standard tends to lead to an efficient resolution of 
conflicts of interest between the parties. 
Unfortunately, this definition is not transferable to the labor context, 
where the two parties stand in a stark opposition to each other. In these 
cases, the resulting bilateral monopoly situation is inferior to the results that 
are obtained in a competitive market. Transaction costs are higher, the risk 
of bargaining breakdown is greater, and the prospect that workers will, 
through this system of negotiation, push wages above competitive levels 
necessarily distorts the operation of product markets. In these adversarial 
 
 48. For the origins of this rule regarding intra-union tensions in the context of race 
relations, see Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). For a more general 
overview of a union’s duties to individual members, see Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 
(1967). 
 49. See Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 110 Cal. Rptr. 511 (Cal. App. 1973).  
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circumstances, there is no way in which the duty to bargain or act in good 
faith can either ensure the security of transactions or reduce conflicts of 
interest, which is its role in these other contexts.  
The difficulty of the good faith concept as it applies in labor law is 
revealed through Section 158(d) of the NLRA, which provides: 
For the purposes of this section [on the definition of unfair labor 
practices], to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual 
obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees 
to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect 
to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, 
or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating 
any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such 
obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or 
require the making of a concession.50 
There are several instructive points in this solution that carry over to the 
FRAND obligations in the patent space. The first is that the duties to bargain 
in good faith are the mutual obligation of the employer and the union, 
notwithstanding the obvious asymmetry in their respective positions: the 
employer represents a coherent firm, while the union represents an array of 
workers with multiple and often clashing interests. The second is that 
imposing mutual duties on the parties does not exactly clarify what those 
duties are. The NLRA language quoted makes it clear the duty to bargain in 
good faith is not a duty to make specific concessions to the opposite side. 
Judicial decisions have held that this provision means what it says, even on 
the question of dues check–off.51 This check–off arises when the union 
wants management to deduct worker dues from their paychecks to spare the 
union the serious risk of non–collection of dues from wayward employees 
(some of whom may not even be union members). The refusal to follow this 
no–concession rule would put the courts in the impossible position of 
having to decide which party should make what concession in the event of 
an impasse.  
At this point, the overall system of private voluntary negotiations would 
surely become unglued. Once it is clear which side is favored by the 
arbitrator, the parties will then bargain in the shadow of that external 
yardstick. After all, why should either party yield to any terms that are worse 
than those which it can get from the all–powerful third party? Hence by a 
combination of direct order and influence, the judicial decision maker will 
take over an entire proceeding that it is singularly ill–suited to manage due 
 
 50. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2012). 
 51. See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970).  
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to innumerable workforce and business–model differences among 
thousands of different union shops. Nonetheless, if the courts will not force 
the parties to an agreement, it is clear under current Supreme Court law that 
the employer can be required to disclose financial information on its overall 
profitability in the hope that a greater common pool of information will 
narrow the bargaining space and increase the likelihood of an agreement.52 
In modern times, the incidence of strikes has gone down, but that change is 
best explained by the increased competitiveness of the employer’s business 
environment, which sets the backdrop for all labor negotiations.  
The notable exception to that rule comes in breakdowns in negotiations 
between unions and public employers in such sectors as transportation and 
education, both service industries, in which a cessation of service is felt 
immediately by a huge group of third parties whose serious economic losses 
are not diminished because the legal system tends to dismiss these losses as 
“incidental.” Public unions, moreover, present the additional danger that 
they are on both sides of the bargaining table, given that the power of their 
well-oiled political machines can drive the election of key political 
officials.53 Since most of these local services are territorially based, these 
unions do not have to fear new entry, and hence are in a position to drive up 
their power in ways that leads, for example, to rules on job security and 
pensions that pose a deep threat to the overall political system. Further, it is 
hard to undo these changes since these pension benefits typically vest as of 
the time of employment, and thus for current employees cannot be cut back 
even for future payments under current contracts.54 The good faith 
obligations for negotiation in this context do little to prevent the breakdown 
of labor markets for public employees.  The situation is quite different in 
the private sector. The decline of tariff barriers and the deregulation of many 
key sectors, like telecommunications, reduces the potential for monopoly 
gains, and therefore undercuts the power that a union could enjoy when 
pitted against an employer that is a sole supplier in a larger marketplace. 
 
 52. See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg., 351 U.S. 149 (1956). 
 53. The matter is now coming to a head before the United States Supreme Court in 
Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 32, 
which remains pending at the time of this writing. See Amy Howe, Argument Preview: For 
the Third Time, Justices Take on Union-Fee Issue, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 20, 2018, 10:30 
AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/02/argument-preview-third-time-justices-take-
union-fee-issue/. 
 54. The key case is Kern v. City of Long Beach, 179 P.2d 799 (Cal. 1947). For an 
exhaustive discussion, see Amy Monahan, Statutes as Contracts? The “California Rule” 
and Its Impact on Public Pension Reform, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1029 (2012). 
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For these purposes, the key question is why the good–faith negotiations 
that are undertaken in the context of FRAND do not exhibit the pathologies 
that the good–faith obligations cannot effectively control in the context of 
labor relationships. The relevant features of SDOs help supply an 
explanation that covers the broad range of cases.55 The initial point is that 
labor negotiations under the NLRA are negative sum games in which any 
bargain that ultimately emerges is going to be less efficient than the 
competitive solution in which firms are allowed, at low cost, to make 
workers take–it–or–leave it offers. These offers in competitive markets will 
have to be high enough to attract workers, but low enough to permit firms 
to sell their own goods and services to their customer base. The FRAND 
negotiations will not be as efficient as the competitive labor markets, but 
they do share this characteristic. Indeed, FRAND negotiations are positive 
sum. The parties are not put together by judicial fiat. Instead, each party that 
enters into these negotiations hopes to help set a standard that will improve 
the economic prospects of all the firms involved by allowing them to 
cooperate with each other by designing a better product leading to a larger 
market for all participants’ inputs.  
The success of these negotiations therefore depends on the ability to 
elicit cooperation from all members. One way that this is done is to separate 
the standard development process from the competitive process that will 
take place once the standards have been put in place. Accordingly, the 
standard development operation is handled by engineers and other technical 
experts who are separated from the business arms of their various firms. 
That separation is enforced because the standard chosen is not set with 
respect to any given patent. Rather, the standard is first chosen on technical 
grounds, albeit with the assurance that known essential patents will be 
available for license on FRAND terms. Only later is it decided which 
patents read onto the standard that has been selected. It is thus common that 
a standard championed by representatives of firm A will require the 
incorporation of technology patented by firm B, or a set of processes that 
have yet to be reduced to patents by anyone. In effect, these negotiations are 
conducted, as it were, behind a veil of ignorance in which the many 
participants will best advance their own interests if the organization sets a 
standard preferred by the greatest number of members. Indeed, it is common 
in many SDOs for the representatives of the end users to participate in the 
discussion about standards even if they are not in a position to vote on what 
standard is set. Their simple presence in the room is an added check against 
various forms of opportunism, for their voice in these deliberations has a 
 
 55. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein et al., The FTC, IP and SSOs: Government Hold-Up 
Replacement Private Coordination, 8 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1, 8–15 (2012). 
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key role in determining how the particular vote on any standard comes out. 
In addition, there is generally an obligation to disclose any patent that a firm 
has that reads onto a standard, so the potential conflict of interest is further 
limited. Unlike the labor situation, the parties know that they do not enjoy 
any monopoly position because the selection of any given standard does not 
guarantee that some rival standard will not emerge to deal with the same 
problem; all the parties therefore are aware that any unilateral effort to 
degrade the standard for partisan advantage could result in the inability of 
the inferior standard to hold its own in the marketplace. Hence, the strong 
insistence by SDOs to avoid the holdup or bargaining problems which are, 
by contrast, routine in collective bargaining between management and 
labor.56 
In sum, as the above discussion has demonstrated, the FRAND bargain, 
in the context of innovation–driven standardization, is a voluntary 
reciprocal exchange of assurances that is central to the formation and 
continuing operation of a vibrant marketplace between innovators and 
implementers that generates enormous positive externalities. That the 
nature of the exchange is somewhat indefinite and vague is not an invitation 
for judicial intervention or interpretation, but a central and necessary feature 
of the framework itself. It is therefore critical to warn against hasty 
interventions in the rare, marginal cases that have the potential to disrupt 
the delicate balance of rights and obligations that lead to successful 
negotiated outcomes in the huge number of routine cases. What is 
necessary, rather, is an appreciation of the inherent reciprocity of the good–
faith foundations of the FRAND exchange, as well as the ability of both 
sides to respond to violations of the good faith covenant on one side with 
reciprocal defections on the other side, such that an implementer can predict 
 
 56. Request for Comments and Announcement of Workshop on Standard Setting 
Issues, 76 FR 28036 (May 13, 2011) (the “Request”) - Patent Standards Workshop, Project 
No. P11-1204, ALL. FOR TELECOMM. INDUS. SOLUTIONS 1 (June 14, 2011), (“ATIS has 
not experienced the hold up problem . . . .”), www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/public_comments/request-comments-and-announcement-workshop-standard-
setting-issues-project-no.p111204-00015%C2%A0/00015-60529.pdf; Re: Federal Trade 
Commission Request for Comments and Announcement of Workshop on Standards-Setting 
Issues (Patent Standards Workshop, Project No. P11-1204), INT’L COMM. FOR INFO. TECH. 
STANDARDS 1 (June 20, 2011), https://goo.gl/43MuNC (“The current officers and staff 
have not been notified of any active patent ‘hold-up’ problems with regards to INCITS 
standards.”); Re: Federal Trade Commission Request for Comments and Announcement of 
Workshop on Standard-Setting Issues (Patent Standards Workshop, Project No. P11-
1204), TELECOMMS. INDUS. ASSOC. 4 (June 14, 2011), https://goo.gl/YcNo6V (“TIA has 
never received any complaints regarding such ‘patent hold-up’ and does not agree that 
‘patent hold-up’ is plaguing the information and telecommunications technology (ICT) 
standard development processes.”).  
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that a failure to bargain in good faith on its end will trigger a corresponding 
request for an injunction by the innovator on the other. As the next Part 
explains, only the threat of escalating harms from defection can generate 
the equilibrium outcome in which both sides uphold their good–faith 
obligations.  
III. ENFORCING FRAND: BALANCING STRONG PROPERTY 
RIGHTS WITH LIABILITY RULES 
As the previous discussion demonstrated, a central feature of the 
FRAND bargain is to provide implementers access to licenses for patents 
covering standardized innovations (i.e., SEPs) that implementers must 
necessarily infringe when practicing the relevant standard.57 Thus, having 
voluntarily entered the FRAND contract, a patent holder waives its right to 
categorically refuse to grant a license, as well as its right to seek an 
injunction against an implementer without first attempting to engage in 
good faith negotiations in pursuit of a license on FRAND terms. The 
question arises, however, whether the injunction remedy should remain 
available to the innovator under any circumstance, most notably when an 
implementer refuses to engage in good–faith negotiations on FRAND 
terms. After all, that quid pro quo is at the heart of the FRAND deal ex ante. 
Indeed, absent the backstop of the injunction threat, implementers will have 
powerful incentives to breach their end of the FRAND contract and pursue 
their own ex post strategy of “patent holdout” or “efficient infringement.” 
That conduct could lead to suboptimal returns from playing the FRAND 
game, and thus an eventual breakdown of the FRAND–enabled innovation 
marketplace.58  
 
 57. See, e.g., the ETSI’s policy objectives, which state:  
In order to further this objective the ETSI IPR POLICY seeks to reduce 
the risk to ETSI, MEMBERS, and others applying ETSI STANDARDS 
and TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, that investment in the 
preparation, adoption and application of STANDARDS could be wasted 
as a result of an ESSENTIAL IPR for a STANDARD or TECHNICAL 
SPECIFICATION being unavailable. 
ETSI Intellectual Property Rights Policy, supra note 20, at 35. 
 58. See, e.g., Anne Layne-Farrar, Business Models and the Standard Setting Process, 
in THE PROS AND CONS OF STANDARD SETTING 34, 49 (2010). Layne-Farrar states: 
[O]nce upstream patent holders have no option of seeking injunctive 
relief, they will have no bargaining power at all in licensing negotiations. 
Especially within standard setting contexts, where the parties typically 
commit t-o license via a FRAND promise, such a rule would amount to 
compulsory licensing, leaving up-stream patent holders at the mercy of 
licensees. 
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Indeed, the fashionable “efficient infringement” term is itself a sign of 
the weakness of the common position, for it evokes the oft–used contract 
notion of “efficient breach” by which it is said that each and every promise 
should be regarded as an option by the promisor to either perform or pay 
damages.59 Under this view, injunctions against doing business with third 
persons should always be off the table. But the objections to the theory of 
efficient breach are numerous.60 The most obvious is that oftentimes the 
calculation of damages is sufficiently complex that important items are too 
difficult to evaluate. This means promisees are thus left systematically 
undercompensated. In addition, in dealing with complex supply chains, 
nonperformance of one contract has ripple effects down the supply chain as 
more and more people are dislocated. In these downstream disputes, it is 
not clear whether the promisor who has not performed has a defense based 
on its inability to obtain the necessary inputs for its performance from his 
promisors. In all supply chain operations, the focus is on making sure that 
performance levels are high through the entire system. On this view of the 
world, any deliberate breach of contract, made in order to secure a high 
price from another customer, is a fatal offense. The use of damages becomes 
acceptable only as a backstop remedy, chiefly in cases where timely 
performance is rendered impossible, say because of a seller’s accidental 
destruction of the goods made for sale.  
In patent law as in ordinary contract law, the goal is performance, not 
damages. Efficient infringement, like efficient breach, is a dangerous 
misnomer. In response to the risks of efficient infringement, the parties 
develop institutional arrangements to overcome all obstacles to high–levels 
of performance.  
Yet an influential body of literature, led by Mark Lemley and Carl 
Shapiro, has instead focused primarily on the risk of “patent holdup” by 
 
 59. An early version of this thesis is found in Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.’s The 
Common Law, which stated: “[T]he only universal consequence of a legally binding 
promise is, that the law makes the promisor pay damages if the promised event does not 
come to pass.” OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 301 (1881). Holmes 
was aware that in some cases the other remedies are allowable but regarded those only as 
exceptional. Id. at 300–01. For a later version see, for example, Charles J. Goetz & Robert 
E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes 
on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM L. REV. 554 (1977). 
For critiques, see Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1. 
(1989), and Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of 
Efficient Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 629 (1988). 
 60. For discussion, see generally Richard A. Epstein & David Kappos, Legal 
Remedies for Patent Infringement: From General Principles to FRAND Obligations for 
Standard Essential Patents, 9 COMPETITION POLICY INT’L 69 (2013). 
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innovators while paying short shrift to the correlative risk of “patent 
holdout” by implementers.61 While their more recent work has passingly 
acknowledged the possibility that the injunctive threat may prod 
implementers into good–faith FRAND licensing negotiations,62 the 
principal focus of Lemley and Shapiro’s work has been to discourage the 
availability of injunctions in the context of products that practice multiple 
patents, such as mobile handsets that practice numerous SEPs.63 Lemley and 
Shapiro advise courts to deny injunctions “when the product that would be 
enjoined contains multiple components, of which only one is the subject of 
the patent in suit”—a factual description that applies to nearly every product 
in the modern marketplace, including many pharmaceutical products.64 That 
“relatively simple step,” according to Lemley and Shapiro, “will help to 
rebalance the patent system and ensure that it enhances rather than impedes 
innovation in component industries.”65  
Lemley and Shapiro’s writings should be read against the backdrop of 
the Supreme Court’s then–recent decision in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, 
L.L.C,66 in which the Supreme Court reversed the traditional rule that a 
patentee is presumptively entitled to some form of injunctive relief for 
infringement of a valid patent. In its stead, the Court adopted a now familiar 
four–part test:  
According to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff 
seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test 
before a court may grant such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate: 
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies 
available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to 
compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of 
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity 
 
 61. See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the 
Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 41 (2012) (conflating the risk of patent holdout 
with explicit “copying” and observing that copying “isn’t much of a problem”); Mark A. 
Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach To Setting Reasonable Royalties for Standard-
Essential Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1135, 1144 n.23 (2013) (observing that courts 
may rightly find it inappropriate to grant injunctions even against unwilling FRAND 
licensees); Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 4, at 1991–92; Carl Shapiro, Injunctions, Hold-
Up, and Patent Royalties, 12 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 280, 280–82 (2010). 
 62. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 49, at 1144 n.23, 1153 (acknowledging that the 
injunction remedy should be available to innovators faced with an implementer who 
refuses to negotiate a FRAND license in good faith). 
 63. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 4, at 2036. 
 64. Id.  
 65. Id. at 2045. 
 66. 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
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is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be 
disserved by a permanent injunction.67 
This “well-established” test mentioned in eBay bears little relationship 
to the historical practices that courts, particularly courts of equity, applied 
in ordinary nuisance cases.68 In these situations, the difficulty of calculating 
present and future damages attributable to ongoing activities persuaded 
courts that the first line of defense should be the injunction, which could 
then be, and often was, supplemented by various forms of interim and 
cleanup damages. The eBay decision jettisoned that subtle and flexible 
mixed remedial approach and instead reverted to a stark and simplistic 
opposition between “property rules” and “liability rules,” as those terms 
were used by Calabresi and Melamed in their seminal article on the 
subject,69 which only considered the pure form of both types of remedy. 
That mistake magnified the errors of both kinds of rules,70 as error and 
implementation costs always increase in exponential fashion as the law 
moves to either corner. The holdout problem created under an injunction–
only regime has far greater disruptive power than it does in a world in which 
a small payment of damages may relax some particularly onerous terms of 
the categorical injunction. And the risk of abuse can be reduced still further 
by attaching various conditions and limitations to injunctive relief that were 
not the focus of the Calabresi and Melamed article. Conversely, the 
valuation problems of a damage system are reduced if the injunction is able 
to reduce the extent and uncertainty of the loss.  
The misunderstanding of the remedial permutations used in standard 
nuisance cases are only magnified when the battleground shifts from 
ordinary nuisance disputes to patent litigation. Even in the two–party cases, 
the great defect of the damages–first approach is that it gives the potential 
infringer every incentive to refuse to negotiate, knowing that the patent 
holder will have to endure expensive litigation to obtain damages down the 
road at a time when either the holder, the infringer, or both may be insolvent. 
The patentee’s situation is further compromised because imitation is the 
most serious form of flattery. Any firm that is normally willing to purchase 
a license from a patentee may well refuse to do so if noncompliant firms 
gain a competitive advantage over compliant firms. Therefore, it becomes 
 
 67. Id. at 391. 
 68. See generally Mark P. Gergen et al., The Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? 
The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203 (2012) (reviewing traditional 
equitable remedies, which shows the dominance of injunctive relief, contrary to eBay’s 
four-part test). 
 69. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 5. 
 70. For discussion, see Richard A. Epstein, Intellectual Property and the Law of 
Contract: The Case Against “Efficient Breach”, 9 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 345 (2013). 
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exceedingly dangerous to adopt remedial structures that presuppose that one 
side, the putative licensee, necessarily acts in good faith regardless of its 
behavior, while the other side, the putative licensor, does not. The use of 
the injunction, suitably restrained in cases of bad faith assertion by the 
patentee, is an essential component of an overall systematic strategy 
designed to prevent the disintegration of the voluntary market. A tool that 
is essential in simple two–party patent disputes does not lose its appeal in 
the context of SEPs. 
The flawed remedial structure announced in eBay is further aggravated 
in the interpretation and enforcement of patent remedies in multiparty 
situations, most notably in connection with SEPs that are licensed under 
FRAND principles. The transaction costs in this context are even higher 
than in the ordinary patent context, and the correct allocation of rights and 
default rules is thus even more critical.71 “Correct” rules are those that (i) 
move the parties toward the Pareto–optimal outcome they would otherwise 
reach through negotiation in the absence of transaction costs, (ii) adopt 
practices that reduce transaction costs in order to promote negotiated 
solutions over litigation, and (iii) uphold and enforce the results of parties’ 
preexisting contractual solutions. “Incorrect” rules create the opposite 
effects, and their distortionary impacts are difficult to bargain around 
precisely because of high uncertainty and high transaction costs. 
In the FRAND context, a mixed remedial system that begins with the 
presumption of an injunction in cases of refusals to deal and bad faith 
negotiations by the putative licensee is the correct approach in that it serves 
each of the above objectives. It is the very threat of the injunction right—
and its associated high transaction costs—that brings the parties to the 
negotiating table and motivates them to draw upon the full scope of their 
knowledge and creativity in forming contractual and institutional solutions 
to the perceived holdup problem.72 Indeed the FRAND architecture—and 
all of its attendant benefits and positive externalities—has arisen because of 
the presumption of injunctive relief, not despite it.  
Patent pools for standard–essential patents present another important 
illustration of the merits of an injunction–first remedial approach. These 
 
 71. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). For the 
enduring viability of this notion, see also Pierre Schlag, The Problem of Transaction Costs, 
62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1661, 1663 n.9 (1989) (citing RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
OF LAW 38, 46–47, 68–69, 81, 82–83, 90, 93–94, 104, 113–14, 122–23 (3d ed. 1986)); 
Merges, supra note 8, at 2655–62. 
 72. See Merges, supra note 8, at 2655 (“[I]n the presence of high transaction costs, 
industry participants have an incentive to invest in institutions that lower the costs of IPR 
exchange.”). 
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pools do not form before the standard is selected, largely because at that 
juncture no one knows the standard, and thus cannot determine which 
patents read onto the standards and which do not. Indeed, any effort to 
bargain for inclusion of a predetermined portfolio of patents before the 
deliberations are concluded makes it much more likely that an inferior 
standard will be selected. “The actual creation of pools typically occurs late 
in the standard life cycle.”73 
 At this juncture, the standard tends to reduce transaction costs in two 
ways. First, it makes it easier for various firms that hold patents that read 
onto the standard to negotiate with each other. Oftentimes, a two–stage 
negotiation works better than a single negotiation with a large number of 
parties. Thus, if twenty–four persons hold patents that read onto the 
standard, it could be easier to find solutions if some separate pools, not 
necessarily of equal size or value, are created. Some patents may be in 
groups of six, others in groups of four. Indeed, there is nothing about this 
process that requires that all patents be placed into pools once the standard 
is set. It could well be that parties that hold especially strong patents will 
prefer to negotiate separately. When patents are placed into pools, there is 
always the risk that the agreement among pool members on royalty rates 
will include, often by error, implicit cross subsidies. But that risk is in turn 
reduced if all the patents appear at the ex ante stage to have roughly equal 
value, which makes the first level of bargaining more efficient. 
The use of these pools thus increases the returns on investment of all 
patent holders from the ex ante perspective.74 They also make it easier to 
allow for cross–licensing among multiple patent owners in ways that reduce 
the potential of infringement suits that exist when a given portion of the 
patent terrain is covered by multiple patents. Just as having small plots of 
real estate in separate hands increases the likelihood of trespass, so too 
holding patents of small terrain does the same in the IP space. The pooling 
solutions thus provide benefits not only in dealing with the outside world, 
but in dealing with other FRAND members, and the negotiations in these 
cases can then serve as useful benchmarks for the negotiations with external 
parties. 
Even holders of patents that ultimately do not read onto standards are 
left better off ex ante, given that the anticipated returns from success are 
higher with a viable pooling option available after the standard is set. And 
 
 73. Justus Baron & Tim Pohlmann, The Effect of Patent Pools on Patenting and 
Innovation—Evidence from Contemporary Patent Standards 12 (Feb. 2, 2015) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/research-faculty/searlecenter
/innovationeconomics/documents/Baron_Pohlmann_effect_of_patents.pdf. 
 74. Id.  
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in many cases, firms may come with portfolios of patents, some of which 
read onto a particular standard even if others do not. Accordingly, some 
measure of diversification reduces the size of the downside. Hence, the 
expectation is that patent pools should increase returns to the members of 
the pool. The logic runs as follows: once one part of the standard is clarified, 
non–pool parties know that their negotiation costs will be reduced because 
they need to deal with fewer parties in a less complex legal environment. 
The conflicts of interest which typically crop up in labor–management 
negotiations are thus muted because of the very different bargaining 
structures, which are, at all stages, calculated to achieve maximum gain. 
The formation of these pools also has its impact on the second stage of 
negotiations, which occurs between holders of patents subject to FRAND 
obligations and outside parties. The standard in this context is, of course, 
necessarily vague when it is stated in the abstract, but the high rate at which 
these negotiations have historically concluded suggests that this vagueness 
leads to fewer breakdowns than one might expect a priori. One reason is 
that the formation of pools will reduce the number of separate negotiations 
that take place. Another is that these negotiations all take place in a 
fishbowl, meaning that an intransigent stand by any one holder of a SEP 
will place pressure not only on the prospective licensees but also on those 
FRAND licensors for the same standard who hold the complementary 
patents whose value will be reduced if any inefficiencies in the final 
standard lead to its rejection in the marketplace. In addition, it is likely that 
there is some overlap between the group of innovators and implementers, 
for some technology players will hold dual roles of licensor and licensee. 
This close interdependence extends not only to any single pool but also to 
other similar pools, creating an environment in which repeat players have 
to weigh the loss of future opportunities against the possible gains of an 
aggressive stance in the immediate transaction.  
All of these soft pressures typically push parties to make deals so that 
the FRAND patents do not sit idle while the underlying negotiations take 
place. These pressures tend to speed up the process of coordination. The 
effort to impose various independent substantive rules on the operation of 
this process is highly costly because it involves the examination of the rate 
of patent utilization in alternative states of the world which are both 
unobservable and difficult to infer from existing practices. Words like 
“reasonable royalties” and “incremental damages” may roll easily off the 
page in government reports, such as the 2011 FTC report entitled “The 
Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice and Remedies with 
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Competition,”75 where it is sometimes stated that sound practice requires, 
“when it can be determined, [for] the incremental value of the patented 
invention over the next-best alternative [to] establish[] the maximum 
amount that a willing licensee would pay in a hypothetical negotiation,” and 
for “[c]ourts [to] not award reasonable royalty damages higher than this 
amount.”76 But it is never clear which the next best alternative is when there 
are two or more, or how that reasonable royalty rate should be determined.77 
Note that the voluntary practice, when goaded by the injunction, does not 
need any independent body to both define and apply these slippery 
definitions in complex cases. It is also worth noting that the administrative 
costs needed to work out either of these rates will necessarily result in the 
decline in value of all standards going forward; after all, once the law 
imposes any external standard, the parties will perforce bargain to that 
background norm, even if it conflicts with prior industry norms and 
practices, which may of course vary from industry to industry. Calculating 
marginal benefits and costs is extraordinarily difficult, and often 
unnecessary given that parties need not know what these are. 
The courts neither have the information nor the institutional capacity of 
replicating, much less improving upon, contractual and institutional 
arrangements such as FRAND and SEP patent pools, which have arisen 
because of the presumption of injunctive relief.78 Thus, at least in the SEPs 
context, it would seem logical for the courts to push the parties toward 
negotiated and coordinated solutions through a strong recognition of 
property rights backed by a principled preference for injunction relief. 
That is particularly true given that the theoretical boogeyman of “royalty 
stacking”—a principal justification for subverting injunctive relief—has 
been empirically debunked. In industries subject to innovation–driven 
standardization, such as mobile handsets, the consistent evidence points to 
a combination of sharp price decreases and massive technological progress, 
as well as low aggregate patent royalty payments and increasing market 
penetration.79 The notion that implementers in such innovation–driven 
industries are being suffocated by an insurmountable patent royalty stack 
has turned out to be nothing more than horror fiction. This reality is perhaps 
 
 75. FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT 
NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 147 (2011). 
 76. Id. at 189. 
 77. For a longer critique of the 2011 report, see Epstein et al., supra note 43. 
 78. See Merges, supra note 24, at 1346 (“Without property rights—backed by the 
threat of production-choking injunctions—the advantages conveyed by the [patent] pool[s] 
would never have been realized.”).  
 79. See supra note 17. 
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best demonstrated by the fact that Google has chosen to enter the mobile 
handset business,80 and Nokia has also elected to reenter that business after 
several years of seeking to monetize its innovations exclusively through 
FRAND licensing agreements.81 If the FRAND licensing business were as 
lucrative as stacking theory predicts, Nokia would have remained a patent 
licensing company, rather than reentering the product space. And, if royalty 
stacking were true, an entity as sophisticated (and opportunity–rich) as 
Google would not have waded into making and selling mobile handsets. 82  
Yet as the following Part describes, courts in the United States have 
largely taken the opposite approach by defaulting to liability rules without 
due regard for property rights, even in the face of evidence of patent holdout 
by implementers,83 which is facilitated by misinterpreting and thus 
redefining FRAND as a wholly one–sided agreement that only serves 
implementers’ interests. These efforts have yielded “incorrect” results in 
that they have not moved the parties toward the Pareto–optimal outcome 
they would achieve absent transaction costs, upheld the results of their 
contractual agreements, or incented them toward negotiated solutions. 
Instead, they have merely encouraged even greater litigation. 
IV. THE EROSION OF THE FRAND FRAMEWORK IN 
RECENT JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND SDO 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS POLICY 
REVISIONS 
As noted in Part II, the FRAND framework is deliberately vague in 
order to provide critical flexibility for parties to shape its contours to the 
 
 80. Tim Higgins & Nathan Olivarez-Giles, Google Announces New Pixel 
Smartphones, Amazon Echo Rival, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 5, 2016, 9:23 AM), www.wsj.com/
articles/google-to-detail-amazon-echo-fighter-called-home-new-phones-1475592365.  
 81. Rory Cellan-Jones, Nokia Dials Back Time to Sell Mobile Phones Again, BBC 
(Dec. 1, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-38167451. 
 82. Of course, Google may see profit opportunities in the handset space that go 
beyond per unit profits from device sales. But it is ultimately irrelevant how Google expects 
to capture value from entering the mobile handset market. The point is simply that Google’s 
decision to enter the market necessarily reveals that Google sees a significant opportunity 
for large supra-competitive profits. That fact directly contradicts the gloomy prediction of 
royalty-stacking theory that aggregate patent royalties will cause firms to “not find it worth 
incurring the costs necessary to develop, manufacture, and sell” products like mobile 
handsets. See Lemley, supra note 7, at 2012. 
 83. See Merges, supra note 8, at 2662 (observing that a strong property rights rule for 
patents facilitates contractual solutions to patents’ high transaction costs, whereas liability 
rules “work against the flexible, voluntary institutions that are formed to overcome the 
costs faced by transactors”). 
2017] INCENTIVES FOR “PATENT HOLDOUT”  1413 
particular circumstances of their negotiations. Notwithstanding its virtues, 
that amorphousness will, from time to time, bring the parties to litigation.84 
In response, courts have too often ignored the contractual and mutual 
exchange that underlies the FRAND bargain, as well as the criticality of 
enforcing the obligation of good faith and fair dealing on both sides. In its 
place they have instead attempted to “clarify” FRAND itself, beginning 
with the false premise that FRAND was principally created to promote 
“widespread” standardization and to avoid “patent holdup,” i.e., that 
FRAND was created for the benefit of implementers alone and should thus 
be interpreted with a presumptive preference toward those interests.85 
Working from this incorrect premise, courts have largely ignored the 
injunctive remedy even in the face of evidence that the implementer refused 
to negotiate at all, or at least in good faith, and have also concluded that 
innovators should take no share of the commercial benefits accruing from 
standardization of their innovations. 
As we illustrate in this Part, the choice between the two strategies—a 
principal preference for liability rules or a mixed approach that begins with 
the injunction remedy—is not just a zero–sum game. Indeed, in the face of 
high transaction costs, pure liability rules tend both to encourage “patent 
holdout” by implementers and to shortchange innovators in ex post 
allocations of the cooperative surplus created by FRAND negotiations. 
Taken together, these two forces reduce the rate of return to innovation 
overall and to FRAND commitments in particular. Innovators are acutely 
responsive to such incentive changes in this context, and ex post 
devaluations of their returns from the FRAND game in a given round 
necessarily have feedback effects on their willingness to participate in 
subsequent rounds. In practice, they might then refuse to license their 
innovations to the industry as a whole, preferring to develop them internally 
or form limited strategic innovation–development partnerships with only a 
select set of industry participants. And if neither of the former alternatives 
 
 84. See, e.g., Microsoft v. Motorola, 2013 WL 2111217, at *10 (W.D. Wash. April 
25, 2013); In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No. 11 C 9308, 2013 WL 
5593609, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013); Apple v. Motorola, 757 F.3d 1286, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 
2014); Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1233 (Fed. Cir. 2014); 
Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research Org. (“CSIRO”) v. Cisco Sys., 809 F.3d 1295, 
1304–05 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Microsoft v. Motorola, 795 F.3d 1024, 1052 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 85. See, e.g., Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *10 (“The purpose of the RAND 
commitment is to encourage widespread adoption of the standard.”); id. at *20 (“In trying 
to reach an agreement, the SEP owner would have been obligated to license its SEPs on 
RAND terms which necessarily must abide by the purpose of the RAND commitment of 
widespread adoption of the standard through avoidance of holdup and stacking.”). 
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is appealing, they might instead reduce their research and development 
allocations across the board. Moreover, if these same parties function as 
innovators in different markets, they should get the benefit of the robust 
protection of FRAND–committed patents advanced by the rule defended in 
this essay: the willingness to participate in a FRAND regime should not 
foreclose the issuance of an injunction against parties that seek to avoid the 
negotiation process, i.e., unwilling licensees. 
The decisions of the Federal Circuit in Apple v. Motorola86 and the 
Ninth Circuit in Microsoft v. Motorola87 are illustrative of the prevailing 
hostility toward injunctions in the FRAND context—even where there is 
evidence of an unwilling licensee—and the dangers of that bias.  
In Apple v. Motorola, Motorola had sought an injunction on the grounds 
that Apple had negotiated in bad faith by refusing Motorola’s licensing 
offers, which Motorola contended were on FRAND terms, and by stalling 
negotiations.88 Judge Richard Posner, sitting by designation on the district 
court, denied that request on summary judgment.89 On appeal, a majority of 
the Federal Circuit panel applied the four–part balancing test set forth in 
eBay, holding that the combination of Motorola’s FRAND commitment and 
its willingness to license its patent effectively foreclosed a finding of either 
irreparable harm or that monetary damages alone would be inadequate.90 
And while the majority opinion, authored by Judge Jimmie Reyna, 
nominally acknowledged that “an injunction may be justified where an 
infringer unilaterally refuses a FRAND royalty or unreasonably delays 
negotiations to the same effect,” it nonetheless concluded that Apple should 
not be enjoined because “negotiations have been ongoing, and there is no 
evidence that Apple has been, for example, unilaterally refusing to agree to 
a deal.”91  
The inconsistency between the court’s legal statement and its holding 
was not lost on Judge Randall Rader, who wrote separately to concur and 
dissent in part. He concurred that a unilateral refusal to take a FRAND 
license should trigger an injunction. But he dissented from the majority’s 
affirmance of the denial of Motorola’s injunction request. Judge Rader 
instead found “evidence that Apple may have been a holdout” and criticized 
the majority’s unwillingness to analyze whether Apple’s refusal to license 
 
 86. 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 87. 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 88. Apple, 757 F.3d at 1332. 
 89. Id. at 1331. 
 90. Id. at 1332. 
 91. Id.  
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on Motorola’s offered terms was a refusal of a “FRAND royalty.”92 He 
further cited evidence that Apple had refused for years to even discuss a 
license while nonetheless infringing the patent in suit.93  
Judge Sharon Prost, on the other hand, also wrote separately to express 
the opposite opinion. While she agreed with the majority opinion that 
Motorola did not qualify for an injunction, she disagreed with both Judge 
Reyna and Judge Rader “that an alleged infringer’s refusal to enter into a 
licensing agreement justifies entering an injunction against its conduct.”94 
Instead, she took the view that an implementer’s negotiation conduct—no 
matter how intransigent—should never justify granting an injunction to the 
holder of the SEP.95 
These fractured views appear to explain the internal inconsistency 
between the statement of the law in Apple and its holding. Yet whatever the 
reasons, the ensuing decision appears to stand for the troubling proposition 
that a proven infringer of FRAND–encumbered patents may avoid an 
injunction so long as it maintains the semblance of ongoing negotiations, 
regardless of whether it has refused to accept FRAND licensing terms. 
Stated otherwise, Apple conflates a unilateral refusal to accept a FRAND 
deal (which is the relevant inquiry) with a unilateral refusal to engage in 
discussions regarding any deal (which is a toothless standard).  
By suggesting that an implementer acts in good faith by simply 
maintaining a negotiation dialogue, without also considering whether the 
implementer has refused to accept a proper FRAND licensing offer, the 
Apple majority opinion encourages two erroneous outcomes. First, it 
suggests that innovators should continue to negotiate even after they have 
offered a license on FRAND terms, thus necessarily eroding their 
bargaining power and the value of FRAND–encumbered patents. Second, 
it suggests that an injunction may not be available unless an implementer 
refuses to engage in any licensing discussions at all, even if it has rejected 
FRAND terms, magnifying the same effect. 
Subsequently, in Microsoft v. Motorola, the Ninth Circuit made a 
similar error. The case arose out of two letters in which Motorola made 
opening offers to license its standard–essential patents covering certain Wi-
Fi and video encoding standards at a rate of 2.25% of the sales price of the 
end products—offers that Motorola represented were consistent with its 
 
 92. Id. at 1332–34 (Rader, J., dissenting in part). 
 93. Id. at 1333–34 (Rader, J., dissenting in part). 
 94. Id. at 1342–43 (Prost, J., dissenting in part). 
 95. Id.  
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FRAND obligations.96 The letters stated the offers were available for twenty 
days. Microsoft did not make a counteroffer or engage in any negotiations. 
Instead, before the end of that twenty–day period, Microsoft sued Motorola, 
asserting Motorola’s initial offer was a breach of its FRAND 
commitments.97 The next day, Motorola responded with a countersuit 
seeking an injunction from the district court, and also filed for an injunction 
with the International Trade Commission (“ITC”).98 Microsoft, in turn, 
amended its complaint to assert that Motorola had further breached its 
FRAND commitments by pursuing injunctions.99  
The district court set out to determine a FRAND range for the Motorola 
portfolios in order to determine whether Motorola’s opening licensing offer 
was a breach of its FRAND commitment. In a 207–page opinion, the court 
concluded that the top end of the FRAND range was approximately 16 cents 
per unit for the video encoding portfolio and 19 cents per unit for the Wi-Fi 
portfolio—figures that were notably lower than Motorola’s opening 
offer.100 Those rates were then presented to a jury, which was asked whether 
Motorola violated its duty of good faith and fair dealing by seeking an 
injunction. The jury found against Motorola and awarded Microsoft 
damages that included the attorneys’ fees Microsoft incurred in defending 
the injunction actions.101 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence 
underlying that verdict. The appellate court accepted the jury’s finding that 
Motorola had breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing by pursuing 
injunctions, citing four categories of evidence.102 Notably, the Ninth Circuit 
reasoned that because Motorola could have ultimately obtained a FRAND 
award from the district court, it lacked a legitimate fear of irreparable harm. 
From there, the appellate court made the leap that, “[i]n the absence of a 
fear of irreparable harm as a motive for seeking an injunction, the jury could 
have inferred that the real motivation was to induce Microsoft to agree to a 
license at a higher-than-[F]RAND rate.”103 In conclusion, the Ninth Circuit 
embraced the theory that a FRAND–encumbered patentee may violate its 
duty of good faith and fair dealing and breach its FRAND commitment by 
seeking injunctive relief, at least where it has not first offered a license on 
 
 96. Microsoft v. Motorola, 795 F.3d 1024, 1032 (9th Cir. 2015).  
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 1033. 
 101. Id. at 1034. 
 102. Id. at 1047. 
 103. Id. at 1046.  
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FRAND terms.104 With respect to damages, the Ninth Circuit held that 
Microsoft was entitled to the attorneys’ fees it incurred in defending against 
the injunctions because such fees were “consequential contract damages” 
arising out of Motorola’s breach of its FRAND obligations.105 
In a similar vein, in March 2015 the IEEE adopted a set of IPR policy 
revisions in which it stated that a FRAND commitment to the IEEE 
“precludes seeking, or seeking to enforce” an injunction except in two 
narrow circumstances: (1) where “the implementer fails to participate in, or 
to comply with the outcome of, an adjudication, including an affirming first-
level appellate review,” or (2) “[i]n jurisdictions where the failure to request 
a Prohibitive Order in a pleading waives the right to seek a Prohibitive Order 
at a later time.”106 Notably, the IEEE’s policy does not even permit 
patentees to pursue an injunction where an implementer has categorically 
refused to take a license on FRAND terms or to negotiate in good faith, and 
is thus even more restrictive than Apple and Microsoft. 
The critical flaw with the combined result of the Ninth Circuit and 
Federal Circuit decisions (and the IEEE’s policy revision) is that it gives 
implementers a “heads I win, tails you lose” litigation alternative to 
pursuing good–faith negotiations, with the dual negative effects of 
categorically lowering the value of FRAND–encumbered patents and 
discouraging negotiated resolutions. Recall that in Microsoft, the dispute 
arose out of Motorola’s opening offer, to which Microsoft only responded 
by immediately filing a lawsuit—an approach the district court and Ninth 
Circuit ultimately embraced and rewarded. Motorola’s injunction request 
only came after Microsoft’s lawsuit and was not the genesis of the parties’ 
litigation proceedings. Yet the Ninth Circuit held that an innovator’s 
opening offer in a FRAND negotiation is subject to such a stringent duty of 
good faith that an innovator may not seek injunctive relief even where an 
implementer refuses to make any good faith counteroffer in the 
negotiations. 
Thus, under Microsoft, an implementer of FRAND–encumbered SEPs 
has numerous motivations and few disincentives to respond to an opening 
licensing offer with a lawsuit. If the innovator’s opening offer is later 
determined to have been FRAND, the implementer can accept the offer at 
 
 104. Id. at 1048–49, n.19 (citing Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp., 946 F. 
Supp. 2d 998, 1006 (N.D. Cal. 2013), for the proposition that seeking injunctive relief 
“before offering a license on [F]RAND terms” is inherently inconsistent with the FRAND 
commitment) (emphasis added).  
 105. Microsoft v. Motorola, 795 F.3d 1024, 1049 (9th Cir. 2015).  
 106. IEEE, supra note 10, § 6.2 at 16–18. 
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that time, several years down the road. While the implementer would be 
aware of the nominal risk of an injunction under such facts,107 it would be 
willing to take that risk since, under Microsoft and Apple, mere participation 
in court–ordered mediation sessions and a post–litigation agreement to pay 
the judicially determined FRAND rate would appear to obviate both 
“irreparable harm” and bad faith, and thus the ability to obtain an 
injunction.108 If, on the other hand, the opening offer is later determined to 
have been above FRAND, the implementer will pay the lower FRAND rate 
and may also obtain its attorneys’ fees if, for instance, the opening offer is 
deemed to have erred from FRAND beyond the zone of good faith. Either 
way, by filing suit the implementer will also force the innovator to incur 
many millions of dollars in litigation costs, the value of which will not be 
reflected in the court’s FRAND determination.109  
Innovators, in turn, must take these realities into account in making their 
opening offers. Under the specter of Microsoft, the correct opening offer is 
no longer one that positions the parties to conclude a license on FRAND 
terms, but rather one that is likely to be FRAND from the outset. Perhaps 
the implementer will make a counteroffer, but under prevailing law that 
offer will not be tested against the same good faith standard that is applied 
to innovators. Hence, availing itself of that option is likely to only generate 
further delay, which could work to the implementer’s advantage. If the 
innovator rejects, the implementer can sue and, at worst, can later accept the 
innovator’s initial offer. Meanwhile, the implementer can argue that any 
untested counteroffer conclusively demonstrates good faith under Apple. 
 
 107. See Microsoft, 795 F.3d at 1048, n.19 (agreeing with the Federal Circuit in Apple 
that “if an infringer refused to accept an offer on [F]RAND terms, seeking injunctive relief 
could be consistent with the [F]RAND agreement, even where the commitment limits 
recourse to litigation”). 
 108. See id. at 1046 (holding that Microsoft’s payment of a judicially determined 
FRAND rate would have “fully compensated for Microsoft’s infringing use” and that the 
potential availability of such an award precluded the possibility of irreparable harm). Apple 
v. Motorola also states:  
Motorola’s FRAND commitments . . . strongly suggest that money 
damages are adequate to compensate Motorola for any infringement. 
Similarly, Motorola has not demonstrated that Apple’s infringement 
caused it irreparable harm. . . . Motorola argues that Apple has refused 
to accept its initial licensing offer and stalled negotiations. However, the 
record reflects that negotiations are ongoing, and there is no evidence 
Apple has been, for example, unilaterally refusing to agree to a deal. 
757 F.3d 1286, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 109. See Apple, 757 F.3d at 1342 (Rader, J., dissenting in part) (“In the absence of the 
threat of an injunction, an infringer would have no incentive to negotiate a license because 
the worst-case scenario from a patent infringement lawsuit is that it would have to pay the 
same amount it would have paid earlier for a license.”). 
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Accordingly, under Microsoft and Apple, innovators are pressured to begin 
at FRAND, and only go lower. Even more troubling, this effect will 
compound itself as innovators pursue further licenses. Once the first 
implementer has taken a license, the next implementer will point to the 
“nondiscriminatory” aspect of FRAND to argue that its licensing rate 
should not be higher but should certainly be lower. The innovator must 
either acquiesce or, again, enter litigation in which it can essentially do no 
better and only do worse. The only way out of this downward spiral is, 
paradoxically, for the innovator to make an initial offer that it feels is safely 
FRAND (or at least sufficiently close to be in good faith) and then to 
embrace litigation (and its attended costs and delays) if the implementer 
does not accept the initial offer. Accordingly, the end result of this 
sequential game theory is a mutual motivation toward litigation and away 
from negotiated resolutions, as well an overall devaluation of FRAND–
encumbered patents. This in turn undermines the FRAND–enabled 
innovation marketplace. 
These difficulties arise out of a misallocation of rights among the 
bargaining parties. Under Microsoft and Apple, implementers face no 
credible injunction risk from pushing FRAND negotiations into the courts 
in search of a lower rate and greater leverage. On the other hand, innovators 
face the risk of a breach of contract and breach of duty of good faith claim 
merely based on their opening offers alone. This allocation of rights and 
risks is particularly misguided since innovators have every reason to avoid 
litigation costs and secure immediate revenues by engaging in licensing 
negotiations in good faith, whereas implementers inherently gain from 
delay, with the gains from reducing the ultimate royalty rate often far 
exceeding the typical costs of litigation. The entire situation would be 
radically altered by one key change in the rule: the innovator should be 
allowed to attack the counteroffer by the implementer because it is below 
the permissible range of a FRAND offer and is thus not in good faith. Only 
if both sides are at risk is there pressure for mutual good faith negotiations. 
The recent case of Core Wireless v. LG Electronics illustrates the 
dangers of a one–sided legal regime. In 2011, Microsoft and Nokia jointly 
formed Core Wireless to hold approximately 2,000 Nokia patents covering 
both standard–essential technologies and nonessential implementation 
technologies.110 The portfolio was then assigned to Conversant Intellectual 
Property Management, an experienced patent licensing specialist, who 
assumed responsibility for licensing the portfolio, as well as all associated 
 
 110. See Ben Dummett, Nokia Sells 2,000 Patents, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 2, 2011). 
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patent litigation and patent prosecution legal costs, in exchange for a 
revenue sharing agreement with Nokia and Microsoft.111 Conversant 
initiated negotiations with LG Electronics, among others. As the district 
court observed in awarding enhanced infringement damages against LG 
five years later: 
After a long series of meetings between the parties, including 
seven meetings in Seoul, Korea, LG invited Core Wireless 
representatives to Korea one last time and indicated that it would 
be making a monetary offer for a license. Rather than make an 
offer or engage in serious, good faith negotiations, LG delivered 
a terse one-page presentation stating that a lawsuit was 
“preferable” to a license, and that LG would prefer to wait until 
another major cell phone manufacturer licensed the portfolio, at 
which point LG intended to be “a follower” in the established 
royalty scheme.112 
In other words, LG appears to have pursued a path of “patent holdout” 
and “efficient infringement.” And while Core Wireless ultimately prevailed 
in litigation, it was forced to expend nearly $6.8 million in legal fees and 
expert fees,113 and incur many years of delay, in order to obtain an award of 
$2.736 million.114 Thus, as Core Wireless illustrates, the dangers of an 
initial misallocation of legal rights and obligations in the FRAND context 
are not merely theoretical or academic, but are real and powerful. Absent a 
credible injunction threat, LG appears to have faced no compelling reason 
to bargain in good faith, and instead invited litigation, driven—according to 
the district court—“not by the merits or strength of its non-infringement and 
invalidity defenses,” but rather “by its resistance to being the first in the 
industry to take a license,”115 and its apparent calculation that the potential 
benefits from the litigation game, from its standpoint, were more than worth 
the candle. 
Correcting the pervasive effects of these misguided incentives requires 
changing the incentives themselves. Thus, the better approach is to hold, as 
noted above, that an implementer has a concrete and reciprocal duty to 
 
 111. Id. 
 112. See Core Wireless Licensing S.a.r.l. v. LG Elecs., Inc., No. 2:14-CV-912-JRG, 
2016 WL 10749825, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2016). 
 113. See Core Wireless’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Expert Witness Fees at *1 
n.1, Core Wireless Licensing S.a.r.l. v. LG Elecs., Inc., No. 2:14-CV-912-JRG (E.D. Tex. 
Nov. 30, 2016), 2016 WL 10749825. 
 114. See Core Wireless, 2016 WL 10749825, at *2. Core Wireless also moved for an 
award of attorneys’ fees and expert fees. These motions are pending as of this writing. 
 115. See id. 
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negotiate a FRAND license in good faith, and that a breach of that duty 
automatically and necessarily gives rise to an injunction, which an 
innovator may pursue at the outset of the litigation. To the extent such an 
approach must be tied to the eBay four–factor test, it would be supported 
under factor three—“that, considering the balance of hardships between the 
plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted”—which should be 
the only relevant consideration under such circumstances.116 Under that 
approach, an implementer may not respond to an innovator’s first offer with 
a lawsuit, but instead must make a good faith offer in furtherance of a 
FRAND agreement and must have that offer rejected before it can sue the 
innovator for breach of the FRAND duties.117 In other words, the 
implementer has no cause of action for breach of the FRAND commitment 
until it has made a good faith offer of its own. Moreover, if an implementer 
rejects a good–faith FRAND offer from an innovator, the implementer is 
automatically subject to an injunction if the patents at issue are adjudicated 
to be valid and infringed. The injunction would not apply if the innovator’s 
offer is found to be outside the good–faith range of FRAND, and an 
injunction would also not be available if the implementer is found to have 
made a good–faith pre–suit FRAND offer. Finally, an implementer that has 
made a good–faith offer and either received no counteroffer or a bad–faith 
counteroffer may sue the innovator. If the claim prevails, the innovator must 
grant a license in accordance with the implementer’s good–faith pre–suit 
offer and must also pay the implementers reasonable attorneys’ fees. 
The above approach moves the parties away from the courtroom and 
toward the negotiating table, where they can craft mutually agreeable 
solutions to their licensing disputes against the backdrop of balanced legal 
rights and remedies for bad–faith conduct on either side.  
 
 116. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
 117. Judge Leonard Davis made similar observations in Ericsson v. D-Link Systems, 
where he noted:  
RAND licensing also includes an obligation to negotiate in good faith. 
This obligation is a two-way street. As potential licensees in a RAND 
negotiation, Defendants possessed an obligation to negotiate in good 
faith and earnestly seek an amicable royalty rate. They failed to do so. 
Defendants’ entire argument boils down to the fact that they believed 
Ericsson’s initial RAND offer was too high. However, Ericsson’s $0.50 
offer was only the starting point in the negotiations. Defendants never 
meaningfully engaged Ericsson in RAND licensing negotiations after the 
initial offer. Further, the fact that the RAND rate was ultimately litigated 
in court does not make Ericsson’s initial offer unreasonable.  
Ericsson Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., No. 6:10-CV-473, 2013 WL 4046225, at *25 (E.D. Tex. 
Aug. 6, 2013), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 773 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
1422 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32:1381  
Indeed, in July 2015, the European Union Court of Justice (“CJEU”) 
adopted a similar approach in Huawei v. ZTE, in which it stated that a 
FRAND–encumbered patent holder may seek and obtain an injunction if: 
(1) it first gives the alleged infringer notice of its claims and the basis for its 
infringement allegations, including identifying the relevant standards 
provisions to which its patents are alleged to be essential, as well as a 
specific written offer on FRAND terms that identifies the royalty amount 
and how it is calculated; and (2) the implementer does not “diligently” 
respond with a good–faith response, i.e., neither accepts the innovator’s 
offer nor makes a specific FRAND counteroffer.118 
Like the approach proposed above, and unlike in Microsoft, the CJEU’s 
approach in Huawei does not allow an implementer to pursue claims against 
the innovator for breach of the FRAND agreement unless the implementer 
has at least provided a good–faith FRAND counteroffer, and thus promotes 
negotiation and cooperative solutions between implementers and 
innovators.119 
The United Kingdom’s High Court of Justice (Patents) further advanced 
these principles in its recent decision in Unwired Planet v. Huawei.120 
Unwired Planet correctly recognized that “eliminating holdup value is not 
the only consideration to take into account” when seeking to apply 
FRAND.121 Rather, “[i]n order to arrive at fair, reasonable and non-
discriminatory license terms the patentee must not engage in hold up nor 
must the licensee engage in hold out.”122 In order to create the proper 
incentives for such mutual good–faith conduct by licensors and licensees, 
Unwired Planet put forth the following two significant holdings.  
First, Unwired Planet made clear that a licensee will not have a 
meritorious cause of action for anticompetitive conduct against a licensor 
who has simply sought a royalty rate that is “higher than the true FRAND 
rate.”123 Rather, “for a royalty to amount to excessive pricing it would have 
to be substantially more than FRAND,” i.e., “a royalty rate can be at least 
somewhat higher than the true FRAND rate and still not be contrary to 
competition law.”124 Thus, an innovator’s licensing offers that are made “as 
a step in negotiation” should not give rise to a cause of action by the 
 
 118. Case C-170/13, Huawei Tech. Co. v. ZTE Corp., 2015 E.C.R. 477, 60–71.  
 119. See also Ericsson, 2013 WL 4046225, at *16 (“Intel cannot rely on its failure to 
negotiate to prove Ericsson’s failure to make a legitimate license offer.”). 
 120. Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711 (U.K.). 
 121. Id. ¶ 95. 
 122. Id. ¶ 96. 
 123. Id. ¶ 153. 
 124. Id. (emphasis added). 
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implementer, even if the offers are ultimately determined to be “a number 
of times higher” than an adjudicated FRAND rate, so long as the offers were 
not intended to “prejudice or disrupt the negotiation,” i.e., were made in 
good faith.125 Relatedly, an innovator should not be deprived of the 
injunctive remedy simply because its pre–suit offers were above the 
ultimately adjudicated FRAND rate, and does not engage in “premature 
litigation” by commencing an infringement suit before first making an offer 
that is later determined to be truly FRAND.126 
Second, Unwired Planet held that an injunction should apply to an 
implementer found to infringe a valid patent and who “refuses to take a 
license on terms found by the court to be FRAND.”127 In such 
circumstances, the implementer should “not be entitled to the protection 
from injunctions provided for by the patentee’s FRAND undertaking” and 
instead would be properly “coerced” into taking a license on FRAND 
terms.128  
In stark contrast to the correct incentives and policies advanced by the 
Huawei v. ZTE and Unwired Planet v. Huawei decisions, the IEEE’s 2015 
policy revisions have only sown discord and undermined the FRAND 
framework’s basic purpose of bringing innovators and implementers into an 
innovation–driven standardization marketplace. For instance, since the 
IEEE adopted its highly one–sided injunction policy, key innovation 
contributors including Qualcomm, Nokia, Ericsson, and InterDigital have 
refused to abide by the policy revision and have also refused to make further 
FRAND commitments to the IEEE on those terms.129  
Similarly, the Federal Circuit and IEEE’s “clarification” efforts with 
respect to the damages remedy in the FRAND context, i.e., “reasonable 
royalties,” have also heavily skewed the playing field in implementers’ 
favor and thus created further distortionary effects and inefficiencies that 
undermine the FRAND regime.  
 
 125. Id. ¶¶ 783–84.  
 126. Id. ¶ 755. 
 127. Id. ¶ 806(5). 
 128. Id. ¶ 167. 
 129. See, e.g., Richard Lloyd, The IEEE’s New Patent Policy One Year on—the Battle 
That’s Part of a Bigger Licensing War, IAM (May 6, 2016), http://www.iam-
media.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=e8f72d6e-a3f8-45d8-882f-3ebdd3a1d69e; Susan Decker & 
Ian King, Qualcomm Says It Won’t Follow New Wi-Fi Rules on Patents, BLOOMBERG 
TECH. (Feb. 11, 2015, 2:29 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-
11/qualcomm-says-new-wi-fi-standard-rules-unfair-may-not-take-part. 
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As previously noted, a central purpose of the FRAND structure is to 
ensure that innovators are “adequately and fairly rewarded”130 for the use 
of their technologies and are “motivated to contribute their patented 
technologies to the standards-development process.”131 As SDOs like ETSI 
and ITU have long recognized and witnessed firsthand, patented 
innovations contribute enormous value to the standardization process and 
to the success of the standards and the products that implement them. Given 
innovators’ contributions to the success of innovation–driven 
standardization efforts like Wi-Fi and 4G, a “reasonable royalty” approach 
intended to “adequately and fairly” compensate innovators and to 
“motivate” their continued contributions to the standards development 
process should allocate some portion of the gains from standardization back 
to innovators.  
Yet the courts have repeatedly held otherwise.132 Most notably in 
Ericsson v. D-Link Systems, Inc.,133 the Federal Circuit held that the 
calculation of a reasonable royalty award for SEPs “should reflect the 
approximate value of [the patent’s] technological contribution, not the value 
of its widespread adoption due to standardization.”134 In other words, 
Ericsson held that “any royalty award must be based on the incremental 
value of the invention, not the value of the standard as a whole or any 
increased value the patented feature gains from its inclusion in the 
standard.”135 
The Federal Circuit reached that holding through heavy reliance on the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Garretson v. Clark,136 which the Ericsson 
court concluded “requires apportionment of the value of the patented 
technology from the value of its standardization.”137 The court’s reasoning 
began with the correct legal premise that a “patent holder should only be 
compensated for the approximate incremental benefit derived from his 
invention,”138 but then veered off course by assuming, without any evidence 
 
 130. ETSI Intellectual Property Rights Policy, supra note 20, at 35. 
 131. INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, supra note 30. 
 132. By missing the basic point of FRAND, courts demonstrate a continuing lack of 
understanding and appreciation for organizational innovations. See OLIVER E. 
WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 
192–93 (1975).  
 133. 773 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 134. Id. at 1233. 
 135. Id. at 1235.  
 136. 111 U.S. 120 (1884). 
 137. Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1233 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
(emphasis added). 
 138. Id. (citing Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120, 121 (1884)). 
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or meaningful analysis, that “widespread adoption due to standardization” 
is not an inherent benefit contributed by standard essential patents, and on 
that basis concluded that a SEP holder should derive no value from the gains 
associated with the standardization of its patented technology.139  
The Federal Circuit subsequently reiterated Ericsson’s holding in 
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation 
(“CSIRO”) v. Cisco Systems,140 where it perpetuated the misguided notion 
that innovators are not rightly entitled to share in the “benefit created by 
standardization—benefit that would otherwise flow to consumers and 
businesses practicing the standard.”141 Applying Ericsson, the court vacated 
the district court’s reasonable–royalty determination, which was based on 
actual licensing offers and discussions between the parties themselves, and 
instructed the lower court on remand to both “consider[ ] the standard’s role 
in causing commercial success” of the adjudicated infringing products and 
to consider an adjustment, i.e., a decrease, to its royalty determination “for 
standardization.”142 
And in March 2015, the IEEE incorporated this aspect of Ericsson into 
its IPR Policy, stating that a “Reasonable Rate” must exclude “the value, if 
any, resulting from inclusion of that [SEP] in the IEEE Standard.”143  
The error underlying the above aspects of Ericsson and CSIRO is, as 
noted earlier, a failure to distinguish between two very different types of 
standards–creation processes: those that merely pick one uniform approach 
from a range of essentially equivalent alternatives, and those that develop 
technological advancements by evaluating and bringing together next–
generation innovations for the widest impact and dissemination through 
standardization. These development standards seek to identify next–
generation innovations and to promote the widespread dissemination of 
those cutting–edge innovations through standardization. The 802.11 Wi-Fi 
standards, which were at issue in Ericsson and CSIRO, fall into that latter 
category, as do the successive generations of cellular telecommunications 
standards, from 2G through 5G.144  
 
 139. Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1233.  
 140. 809 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2015).  
 141. Id. at 1305.  
 142. Id. at 1305–06.  
 143. IEEE, supra note 10, § 6.1 at 16. 
 144. For an example, see the ETSI’s explanation of “What We Do,” which states:  
We facilitate the early exchange of information between the research and 
standardization communities. Researchers benefit from early exposure 
to the issues they face in industrial take-up of their ideas. Industry 
benefits from faster exploitation of research results. Research input is 
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The apportionment requirement of Ericsson and CSIRO makes sense in 
the former context, i.e., technology–agnostic “standard setting,” which, by 
definition, derives no particular benefit from selecting one approach over 
another.  
But Ericsson and CSIRO’s apportionment requirement (and the IEEE’s 
adoption of that requirement) is wholly misguided when applied to the latter 
context of innovation–driven standards development. In this scenario, it 
would be virtually impossible to achieve meaningful technological 
advances across generations of standards without the close participation and 
extensive technological contributions of innovators like Qualcomm, Nokia, 
and Ericsson. And those innovative contributions are the result of 
significant risk and investment145—exceeding billions of dollars per 
year146—which innovators undertook with the full expectation of “adequate 
and fair” returns as set forth in their FRAND contractual agreements. 
Properly understood, the standards–development process is a collaborative 
joint venture between innovators and implementers in which both parties 
seek to maximize the commercial success of their respective contributions, 
including through widespread adoption of the standards and thus the 
creation of a widespread market for their innovations and products. Having 
achieved that goal, both parties to the venture should share in the benefits 
of their mutual standardization efforts.  
By requiring apportionment of the value of standardization in all cases, 
Ericsson and CSIRO appear to conflate innovation–driven standards 
development (which was relevant to those cases) with technology–agnostic 
 
very relevant in early study phases, when alternative technical solutions 
have to be evaluated. 
ETSI, What We Do: From Research to Standards, http://www.etsi.org/about/what-we-
do/research [https://perma.cc/4QH7-LWAL] 
 145. David J. Teece, The “Tragedy of the Anticommons” Fallacy: A Law and 
Economics Analysis of Patent Thickets and FRAND Licensing, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.  
1489 (2017). 
 146. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Qualcomm Incorporated In Support of Neither 
Party at *2, Microsoft v. Motorola, 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015) (No. 14-35393), 2014 
WL 4802385 (noting that Qualcomm invests $5 billion per year in research and 
development, amounting to 20% of its annual revenues). 
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standards setting (which was not),147 148 thereby depriving innovators of 
rightfully earned returns on their extensive R&D investments and 
contributions to successful standardization. This, in turn, further depresses 
the value of standard–essential patents and further rewrites the FRAND 
bargain to the detriment of innovators and, ultimately, innovation.149  
Garretson—which was decided in 1884 and neither faced nor addressed 
any of the above standards–related considerations—should not be literally 
applied to cases like Ericsson and CSIRO. Rather, consistent with 
Garretson and Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp.,150 SEP 
infringement damages should reflect the value of the patentee’s contribution 
to the product’s commercial success, including through innovation–driven 
standards development. 
Indeed, the vast majority of innovation–driven SDOs appear to disagree 
with Ericsson, CSIRO, and the IEEE on this issue, as no major SDO other 
than the IEEE has incorporated such an apportionment requirement into its 
IPR policy. Moreover, the IEEE’s incorporation of the Ericsson 
 
 147. See Ericsson v. D-Link Systems, Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1233 (Fed. Cir. 2014).  
When a technology is incorporated into a standard, it is typically chosen 
from among different options. Once incorporated and widely adopted, 
that technology is not always used because it is the best or the only 
option; it is used because its use is necessary to comply with the standard. 
In other words, widespread adoption of standard essential technology is 
not entirely indicative of the added usefulness of an innovation over the 
prior art.  
Id.; see also Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Res. Org. v. Cisco Sys., 809 F.3d 1295, 1305 
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[T]he value of the technology . . . is distinct from any value that 
artificially accrues to the patent due to the standard’s adoption. Without this rule, patentees 
would receive all of the benefit created by standardization—benefit that would otherwise 
flow to consumers and businesses practicing the standard.”). 
 148. See supra Part II (distinguishing between technology–agnostic standard setting 
such as picking a side of the road to drive on and innovation–driven standards 
development). 
 149. See J. Gregory Sidak, Apportionment, FRAND Royalties, and Comparable 
Licenses After Ericsson v. D-Link, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1809, 1867 (2016). Professor Sidak 
explains:   
No economic or normative justification supports the assumption that all 
of the seller surplus from the standard should accrue to the implementers. 
Without the SEP holder’s contribution to the value of the standard, the 
implementer’s profit from the sale of the end product that practices the 
standard would not exist. There is no economically sound reason to deny 
an SEP holder any portion of the value of the standard that it helped to 
create. 
Id.; see also id. at 1862–67. 
 150. 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (developing an influential set of factors that 
courts consider when calculating reasonable royalties). 
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apportionment rule has led to the aforementioned mutiny by numerous 
members, including Qualcomm, InterDigital, Ericsson, and Nokia, who 
have refused to make FRAND assurances under the March 2015 policy.151 
And an analysis of the IEEE’s response to members’ opposition to that 
revision has identified “a statistically significant bias against the firms that 
opposed the bylaw amendments—primarily large SEP holders—and in 
favor of revisions designed to devalue SEPs.”152 
In sum, what is wholly lacking from this one–sided approach is an 
awareness that opportunism and holdups are a two–way street. A firm that 
invests heavily in a patent that reads onto a standard may be met by a refusal 
to deal from a potential FRAND licensee, who claims that the rate is above 
some supposed competitive rate of return. But beneath the objection lies the 
simple point that the refusal to accept terms may well deprive that patentee 
of the rate of return needed to make its investment worthwhile, just as can 
happen with common carriers and public utilities if faced with confiscatory 
rates. Therefore, in the abstract, the risks are far from symmetrical. Indeed, 
the greater the hue and cry about exploitation by the patentee, the more 
likely it is that the potential licensee can reduce the terms, knowing that 
injunctions will only be issued in rare cases that are not relevant to routine 
business transactions. Therefore, at this point, whenever the specter of 
bilateral opportunism arises, where does the greater peril lie? In many 
instances, the most likely source of abuse lies with the putative licensee, 
who already has what it wanted (use of the innovator’s valuable technology 
as part of its products and the standard) and who (absent a court order) can 
profit from that technology through its product sales without paying 
anything to the innovator at all. And the prospective licensee’s incentives 
for such opportunism only increase once it has little or no SEPs of its own 
to license out. The same situation arises when its counterparty is purely an 
innovator or patent holder, rather than an innovator–implementer. In such 
circumstances, the putative licensee in this round has little concern for 
maintaining good will with the putative licensor, as their roles will not be 
reversed in future rounds, thereby further weakening the elaborate set of 
soft institutional and social constraints that bind parties who both contribute 
patents to the SDO standard and practice that standard. 
Refreshingly, the UK’s High Court of Justice has recently pushed back 
against the implementer–centric tendencies of American courts and the 
IEEE. In Unwired Planet, the High Court held that FRAND does not 
compel that “the patentee could not appropriate some of the value that is 
 
 151. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 152. See Sidak, supra note 9, at 333. 
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associated with the inclusion of his technology into the standard and the 
value of the products that are using those standards,” and that it is “not 
necessary to deprive the patentee of its fair share of those two sources of 
value in order to eliminate hold up and fulfill the purpose of FRAND.”153 
Indeed, that point was undisputed by both sides in the Unwired Planet 
matter notwithstanding the Federal Circuit’s decisions in Ericsson and 
CSIRO.154 
V. IMPLEMENTER–CENTRICISM IN ITS LARGER LEGAL 
AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT 
As we have shown, the misguided judicial and policy approaches we 
discuss in this Article appear driven by a presumptive and pervasive 
prejudice in favor of implementers and against innovators. The central 
thrust of that view is to minimize returns to innovation inputs via attractive 
but false theories like royalty stacking, all in order to augment returns to 
commercial embodiments and thus ensure (so the theory goes) that the 
production of commercial embodiments can continue.155 These same 
philosophical foundations underlie the eBay decision, in which Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence appeared to sound an alarm by observing that “[a]n 
industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for 
producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing 
fees,”156 and which courts (particularly in America) have subsequently 
applied in a manner that effectively precludes the injunction remedy to 
companies that do not produce their own commercial embodiments of their 
inventions.157  
 Although we demonstrate and explore that object–centric bias through 
a focus on FRAND and the mobile handset marketplace, the sources of that 
bias run much deeper, and its troubling implications reach far beyond 
standard–reliant industries.  
This bias arises because our commercial society is fundamentally built 
to value, protect, and reward “things” or “objects” rather than “ideas”—
objects that embody innovations, but not necessarily the underlying 
innovations themselves. The ultimate consequence of our current “objects 
 
 153. Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711 [¶ 97] (U.K.). 
 154. Id.  
 155. See Barnett, supra note 9; Alexander Galetovic, Stephen Haber & Lew Zaretzki, 
Is There an Anticommons Tragedy in the World Smartphone Industry?, 32 BERKELEY 
TECH. L. J. 1527 (2017). 
 156. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J. 
concurring). 
 157. See Barnett, supra note 9. 
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over ideas” framework is that it impedes the development and growth of the 
“ideas economy” at its seminal moment. The confused logic of Justice 
Kennedy’s position represents a rejection of the basic principle, as old as 
Adam Smith, that gains from trade derive from socially productive 
specialization in the marketplace, and that free–market actors will allocate 
resources where they can secure the highest value. There is thus no reason 
to lament, as Justice Kennedy did, that patents have increasingly emerged 
as a distinct asset class. Rather, that is precisely the trend that should be 
encouraged. As the costs and barriers to manufacturing and implementation 
continue to plummet—whether through globalization, robotics, 3D 
printing, advances in computing hardware and software, or otherwise—it is 
increasingly the ideas themselves, not their implementation, that hold the 
greatest value. And it is in this realm of ideas and innovation that human 
beings will continue to hold a productive role for the foreseeable future.  
If we are to move into this next phase of our economic existence, ideas 
must be protectable, transactable, and monetizable. Our legal rules and 
social norms must recognize and allocate value and primacy to innovation, 
while also embracing a new economic order in which the development of 
commercial embodiments becomes a low–margin industry. Most notably, 
an efficient marketplace for innovation necessarily allows specialization 
between innovators and implementers, rather than forcing an increasingly 
inefficient vertical integration between the two. Thus, in Silicon Valley 2.0, 
brilliant young entrepreneurs should not be distracted by developing and 
selling their innovations as products, but rather should be able to develop 
firms that occupy the far more impactful (and lucrative) role of generating 
and transacting ideas alone. 
This Article thus focuses on the treatment of FRAND–encumbered 
standard–essential patents because that subject is at the forefront of these 
far broader issues. By and large, FRAND–encumbered SEPs are not vague, 
abstract, infinitely broad, whimsical, or practically irrelevant. They 
encompass and protect precise, narrow, and concrete engineering 
innovations that are the results of billions of dollars in research and 
development and millions of hours of grinding labor,158 trial and error, and 
occasional genius by engineers who know their field of art and continually 
work to advance it. These mere ideas yield real benefits and real results. It 
is these ideas that have moved us from 2G to 3G to 4G and now on to 5G, 
enabling billions and even trillions of dollars in economic gains. It is these 
 
 158. See Alexander Galetovic & Kirti Gupta, Royalty Stacking and Standard Essential 
Patents: Theory and Evidence from the World Mobile Wireless Industry 19–20 (Hoover 
Inst. Working Grp. on Intellectual Prop., Innovation, & Prosperity, Working Paper No. 
15012, 2016), https://hooverip2.org/wp-content/uploads/ip2-wp15012-paper.pdf. 
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ideas that have led to the magic of Wi-Fi. We have all enjoyed their massive 
benefits, and it is only logical that our commercial legal regime should 
enable the protection, transaction, and monetization of such innovations as 
standalone assets. 
The patent system is currently our most sophisticated mechanism for 
achieving that aim. Thus, the anti–patent, anti–licensing, and anti–innovator 
trends we identify here represent precisely the wrong approach at exactly 
the wrong time. Rather than working from the premise that the FRAND 
marketplace is inherently flawed and that one side of the bargain requires 
continuous and significant judicial protection against systematic abuse from 
the other, courts, legislators, regulators, and academics should recognize 
that it is the very combination of strong property rights for innovation and 
strong enforcement of voluntary contractual arrangements that has brought 
us this far—and that this approach is the only one that can take us further. 
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